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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND TENDENCIES IN THE TAXATION OF
INTANGIBLES
In the decision of Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky' the
Supreme Court of the United States in 1905 definitely set at rest the proposition that tangible personal property having acquired a permanent situs
in another state is not subject to taxation in the state of the owner's domi2
cile.
Since that time comparatively little difficulty has been encountered in
the taxation of tangibles, though it was not until 1925 that the full scope
of this doctrine was applied to inheritance taxation as distinguished from
3
property taxes in the case of Frick v. Pennsylvania.
The maxim mobilia sequuntur personaim,4 having thus been definitely
circumscribed with reference to its application to tangibles, remained in its
complete vigor as applied to intangibles.
Two problems in this connection have given rise to considerable difficulty. First, when is property to be classed as intangible, or, to state it
differently, may documentary evidence of property acquire the status of
tangibles for purposes of taxation? Second, may intangibles be taxed otherwise than at the domicile of the owner? Additional difficulties arose
over possible distinctions between the application of property taxes and inheritance or succession taxes.
Until very recently the courts seemed to be pointing in the direction
of an affirmative answer to both of the above questions, particularly in the
case of transfer taxes.
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in the case of
1. 199 U.S. 194, 26 S.Ct. 36, 50 LEd. 150.
The Union Refrigerator Transit Co., a Kentucky
corporation, owned various items of rolling stock
permanently employed in other states. Kentucky,
applying the maxim mobilia sequuntur personam,
levied a tax upon all such cars. The tax was
held invalid as a tax on property not within the
jurisdiction of the state and in violation of the
due process clause of the Fourteenth, Amendment.
2. See also Louisville & Jeffersonville Ferry
Co. v. Kentucky, 188 U.S. 385, 23 S.Ct. 463
47 L.Ed. 513 (1903); Delaware, Lackawanna &
Western Ry. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 198 U.S. 341,
25 S.Ct. 669, 49 L.Fd. 1077 (1905).
3. 268 U.S. 473, 45 S.Ct. 603, 69 L.Ed. 1058.
Frick died domiciled in Pennsylvania leaving
a large estate, part of which consisted of tangible
personal property permanently kept in New York
and Massachusetts. The tax of Pennsylvania on
the succession to the tangible property with an
actual situs in other states was held invalid as a

violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
4. The maxim mobilia sequuntur personam,
meaning moveables follow the person, is ordinarily taken to mean that the situs of personal
property is at the domicile of the owner. For
its general application to matters of taxation see
2 COOLEY. TAXATION (4th ed. 1924) 440.
5. 233 U.S. 434. 34 S.Ct. 607, 58 L.Ed. 1030
(1914). A non-resident of New York had died
leaving in a safe deposit box in a New York
bank certain promissory notes made by a resident of Chicago, secured by mortgages of Chicago land to Illinois trustees. New York levied
a transfer tax under a statute purporting to impose a tax with respect to "property within the

state." The Court took the position that municipal bonds were recognized as being so far tangible
as to be taxable where found and that promissory notes were of the same character; that it
was proper for the state to treat the debts and
mortgages as "property within the state" with-
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Wheeler v. Sohmer5 upholding a New York transfer tax with respect to
promissory notes kept in New York merely by virtue of the presence of
the paper evidence within the state, the owner being a non-resident, together
with numerous state cases of a somewhat similar tenor, 6 had seemed7 to
go far toward establishing the doctrine that bonds, notes, and other forms
of commercial paper are not merely evidences of property but may be so
far regarded as property in themselves as to be treated as tangibles, and as
having the ability to acquire for purposes of taxation a situs of their own
apart from the domicile of their owner. Numerous cases appeared to
regard the doctrine as established that state and municipal bonds may have
a situs of their own apart from the domicile of their owner," and it was asserted that the same doctrine, in conformity with the business man's conception, 9 should be applied to promissory notes, other commercial paper, and
money on deposit. At the same time that these doctrines were being adhered to by the Supreme Court, the doctrine of business situs by virtue of
which credits may be given a situs for purposes of taxation at the place
where they are employed in a continuous business, though the domicile of
the owner be elsewhere, had become well established. 10
in the meaning of the statute solely by virtue of
the presence of the paper representation, and
that in so doing the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment was not violated.
6. In re Waldron's Estate, 84 Colo. 1, 267 P.
191 (1928); Blain v. Irby, 25 Kan. 499 (1881);
Matter of Whiting, 150 N.Y. 27, 44 N.E. 715
(1896); People ex rel. Burke v. Wells, 184 N.Y.
275, 77 N.E. 19 (1906); In re Gibb's Estate, 60
Misc. Rep. 645. 113 N.Y.S. 939 (1908); In re
Tiffany's Estate, 143 App. Div. 327, 128 N.Y.S.
106 (1911); State v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of
Maryland, 35 Tex. Civ. App. 214, 80 S.W. 544
(1904); Hall v. Miller, 102 Tex. 289, 115 S.W.
1168 (1909).
"Promissory notes and bonds, being things of value in themselves, salable in the
market and passing freely from hand to hand,
have a real situs and are taxable in any state
in which they are permanently located . . .. "
Beale, Jurisdiction to Tax (1919) 32 HARV.L.
REV. 587, 598. Beale, Progress of the Law:
Taxation (1925) 38 HARV.L.REV. 281, 287.
7. In many or most of the state eases giving
lip service to the doctrine of Wheeler v. Sohmer
a careful examination will reveal that the decision might well have been based on other
grounds. "Obitcr statements are not infrequently found, especially in the more recent cases,
indicating a tendency on the part of the courts
to regard bonds, notes, and other forms of commercial paper as constituting not merely evidence
of property, but as property itself, thus assimilating them to tangible chattels susceptible of an
actual situs determined by their physical local-

ity. [citing and quoting from numerous cases]
. .. . Notwithstanding these statements and others which might be referred to, it is believed
that few, if any, cases can be found in which
the result necessarily depended upon the ascription of an independent situs for property taxation to commercial paper
Note, L.R.A.
1915C 919, 920.
8. State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, 15
Wall. 300, 21 LEd. 179 (1873); New Orleans v.
Stempel, 175 U.S. 309, 20 S.Ct. 110, 44 L. Ed.
174 (1899); Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U.S. 189,
23 S.Ct. 277, 47 L. Ed. 439 (1902); Wheeler v.
Sohmer, supra note 5; and many others.
9. Blackstone v. Miller, supra note 7, at 201;
Wheeler v. Sohmer, supra note 5, at 439.
10. Catlin v. Hull, 21 Vt. 152 (1849); Goldgart v. People, 106 I1. 25 (1883); Hutchinson
v. Board of Equalization of the City of Oskaloosa, 66 Iowa 35, 23 N.W. 249 (1885); Finch
v. York County, 19 Nebr. 50, 26 N.W. 589
(1886) ; Marshall Wells Hdw. Co. v. Multnomah
County, 58 Ore. 469, 115 P. 150 (1911); Billingburst v. Spink County, 5 S.D. 84, 58 N.W. 272
(1894); New Orleans v. Stempel, supra note 8;
B'ristol v. Washington County, 177 U.S. 133,
20 S.Ct. 585, 44 L. Ed. 701 (1900) ; State Board
of Assessors v. Comptoir National d'Escompte,
191 U.S. 388, 24 S.Ct. 109, 48 LEd. 232 (1903);
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. New Orleans, 205
U.S. 395, 27 S.Ct. 499, 51 L.Ed. 853 (1907);
Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Board
of Assessors of Parish of Orleans, 221 U.S. 343,
31 S.Ct. 550, 55 L.Ed. 762 (1910).
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If bonds and notes be recognized as having the capacity to acquire a
situs of their own as chattels, and if choses in general may acquire a business situs, may all still properly be subjected to the taxing power of the
state of the owner's domicile? There seemed little occasion, in view of
the cases, to question the correctness of an affirmative answer to this query,
though as a matter of policy some states declined to apply such a tax.'
The net result was double, and sometimes triple, or even quadruple
taxation of intangibles. This was widely viewed as undesirable and unsound economically, but the courts repeatedly asserted that such so-called
double taxation violated no provision of the federal constitution, 12 and the
only solution seemed to be left to a matter of legislative determination.
The decision of Frick v. Pennsylvania, which definitely ended the evil
practice of two states taxing the transfer of the same tangible property,
though asserting that intangibles stood on a different basis and were to he
distinguished, 3 certainly gave a decided impetus to the contention that

ways and means should be devised whereby to reach the same result with
respect to intangible property. Little progress was made by the courts,
however, in that direction during the following three years, while the evils
of the above mentioned system of so-called double taxation became ever
more pronounced and the necessity for relief ever more pressing. With the
decision in 1928 of Blodgett v. Silberman 14 sustaining a tax by the decedent
owner's domicile on the transfer of bonds kept in another state the United
States Supreme Court approached somewhat nearer to a solution of this
11.

Wilcox

v. Ellis, 14 Kan.

588

(1875);

Fisher v. Commissioners of Rush County, 19
Kan. 414 (1877); Buck v. Board of Commissioners of Miami County, 103 Kan. 270, 173 P.
344 (1918); State v. Harrington, 68 Mont. 1,
217 P. 681 (1923); People v. Gardner, 51 Barb.
(N.Y.) 352 (1868); People ex rel. Jefferson v.
Smith et al, 88 N.Y. 576 (1882); Poppleton v.
Yamhill County, 18 Ore. 377, 23 P. 253 (1890).
See Mackay v. San Francisco, 113 Cal. 392, 45
P. 696 (1896); Mackay v. San Francisco, 128
Cal. 678, 61 P. 382 (1900) ; ,state of Fair, 128
Cal. 607, 61 P. 184 (1900) ; Stanford v. San
Francisco, 131 Cal. 34, 63 P. 145 (1900) ; Re
Borden, 208 Ill. 369. 70 N.E. 310 (1904) ; Hunter v. Board of Supervisors, 33 Iowa 376 (1872).
For eases holding that such a tax at the owner's
domicile would be unconstitutional see Common• vealth v. West India Oil Refining Co., 138 Ky.
828. 129 S.W. 301 (1910) and Commonwealth
v. B. F. Avery & Sons, 163 Ky. 828, 174 S.W.
518 (1915).
12. "Personal property, as this Court has declared scain and again, may be taxed, either at
the domicil of its owner, or at the place where
the property is situated, even if the owner is
neither a citizen nor a resident of the state

which imposes the tax." Bristol v. Washington
County, supra note 10, at 145. "No doubt it
would be a great advantage to the country and
to the individual states if principles of taxation
could be agreed upon by which taxation of
substantially the same property in two jurisdictions could be avoided. But the Constitution
of the United States does not go so far." Kidd
v. Alabama, 188 U.S. 730, 732, 23 S.Ct. 401, 47
See also Tappan v. MerL.Ed. 669 (1903).
chant's National Bank, 19 Wall. 490, 499, 22
L.Ed. 189 (1873); Savings and Loan Society
v. Multnomah County, 169 U.S. 421, 427, 18
S.Ct. 392, 42 L.Ed. 803 (1897); Blackstone v.
Miller, supra note 8, at 205; Union Refrigerator
Transit Co. v. Kentucky, supra note 1, at 205;
Hawley v. Maiden. 232 U.S. 1, 13, 34 S.Ct. 201.
58 L.Ed. 477 (1914) ; Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240
U.S. 625, 631, 36 S.Ct. 473, 60 L.Ed. 830
(1916); Fidelity and Columbia Trust Co. ,.
Louisville. 245 U.S. 54, 58, 38 S.Ct. 40, 62 L.Ed.
145 (1917); Cream of Wheat Co. v. County of
Grand Forks, 253 U.S. 325, 330, 40 S.Ct. 558,
64 L.Ed. 931 (1920); and many other cases.
13. Supra note 3, at 494.
14. 277 U.S. 1, 48 S.Ct. 410, 72 L.Ed. 749
(1928).
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problem. The full significance of the decision was not apparent, however,
at the time.
As the law stood prior to the decision by the United States Supreme
Court of the recent cases of Safe Deposit and Trust Company of Baltimore
v. Virginia,"s Farmers Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota,"6 and Baldwin v.
Missouri"7 taxes on intangible property or inheritance taxes upon its transfer

could be levied frequently in two, three, or even more jurisdictions with
the consequent injustice of subjecting the same economic interest to the
burdens of more than one tax.
The Union Refrigerator Transit Co. case had specificially exempted intangible property from its doctrine denying the application of the maxim
mobilia sequuntur personam where the property had acquired a permanent
situs in another jurisdiction.' 8 Likewise in Frick v. Pennsylvania, extending the doctrine of the Union Transit case to its logical conclusion and applying it to inheritance taxes, a similar exemption of intangibles was specified."9 . This left the maxim in its full application to intangibles at the same
time that states other than the domicile were permitted to tax on different
and more or less inconsistent principles. The difficulties in this connection leading to especially objectionable double taxation had been particularly emphasized since the decisions in Blackstone v. Miller,'2 upholding a
transfer tax by New York upon a deposit in a bank in that state on the
death of the non-resident depositor, based on the control of the state over
the debtor by virtue of its domicile therein, and in Wheeler v. Sohmer, upholding a similar tax upon promissory notes kept in New York merely by
virtue of the presence of the paper evidence, though owned by a nonresident. In neither case did the prospect of two states taxing the transfer
of the same property at the same time affect the result or appear to raise
in the mind of the Court any serious constitutional problem. 21 While these
15. 280 U.S. 33, 50 S.Ct. 59, 74 L.Ed. 180
(1929).
16. 280 U.S. 204, 50 S.Ct. 98, 74 L.Ed. 371
(1930).
17. 281 U.S. 586, 50 S.Ct. 436, 74 L.Ed. 1056
(1930).
18. After holding that the same rule as applied to land should govern the taxation of tangible chattels the Court said: "Respecting this,
there is an obvious distinction between tangible
and intangible property, in the fact that the latter is held secretly; that there is no method by
which its existence or ownership can be ascertained in the state of its situs . . . . So if the
owner be discovered, there is no way by which
he can be reached by process in a state other
than that of hig domicil, or the collection of the
tax otherwise enforced. In this class of cases
the tendency of modern authorities is to apply thb maxim mobilia sequuntur personain, and

to hold that the property may be taxed at the
domicil of he owner . . . and also . . . in the
state where the property is retained .
Supra
note 1, at 205.
19. Supra note 3, at 494.
20. Supra note 8.
21.
"No doubt this power on the part of two
states to tax on different and more or less inconsistent principles leads to some hardship.
It may be regretted, also, that one and the same
state should be seen taxing on the one hand according to the fact of power, and on the other,
at the same time, according to the fiction that,
in succession after death, mobilia sequuntur per.
sonat and domicile governs the whole. But these
inconsistencies infringe no rule of constitutional
law." (Italics the writer's) Blackstone v. Miller,
sura note 8, at 204, 205.
"It would be an extraordinary deduction
from the
Fourteenth
Amendment to deny the power of a state to
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cases dealt specifically with transfer taxes, the language used was broad
enough to apply to property taxes as well. 22 The application of the doctrine
of these cases, together with that of business situs, while there continued
to be recognized a jurisdiction on the part of the domicile of the owner to
tax by virtue of the fiction mobilia sequuntur personam, constituted the
chief sources of multiple state taxation of intangibles, though certain2 3other
doctrines were also recognized which gave rise to similar difficulties.
On the basis of the above a tax on the same economic interest in ab
many as four different jurisdictions at the same time was quite possible.
Suppose that A, a resident of state 1, has an agent in state 2 with headquarters in a city near the border of state 3 conducting for him a business
of lending money on real estate mortgages and collecting and reinvesting
the money. Suppose that the agent makes loans both to residents of state
2 and to residents of state 3 across the border who come to his office for
that purpose. Then suppose that for convenience these notes and mortgages when obtained are sent to another agent of A in state 4 for safe
keeping. Under these facts, let us suppose that A dies and the various
states involved seek to collect an inheritance tax. State 1, being the domicile of A, the owner or creditor, apparently would be permitted by all courts
to tax all of the credits in accordance with the maxim mobilia sequuntur personam as it has been uniformly applied in the past. State 2, where the
agent is conducting the business, would seem to be entitled to tax the
24
The fact that
transfer of all of the credits on the basis of business situs.
on would be
is
carried
business
the
where
the notes are not kept in the state
2
residing
persons
from
come
notes
the
of
some
The fact that
immaterial .
adopt the usages and views of business men in
a (tax) statute on the ground that it was depriving them of their property without due process of law." Wheeler v. Sohmer, supra note
5, at 439.
22. Keeping in view the distinction then adhered to between the nature of and requisities for
a property tax and a transfer tax, Wheeler v.
Sobmer is not to be taken as authority for the
proposition that the mere presence of the notes
gave jurisdiction for a property tax, which was
not necessary to a decision, though Mr. Justice
Holmes appeared to be willing to go that far.
However, the broad language of Mr. Justice
Holmes was concurred in by only three other
members of the court. Mr. Justice McKenna
concurred in a separate opinion basing his decision solely on the distinction between a property tax and a succession tax and declining to
support any doctrine by which a property tax
would be sustained under the circumstances of
the case in question. With this opinion Mr.
Justice Pitney concurred. The remaining three

justices dissented on the ground that there was
not a sufficient basis for a property tax, that the
thing of value was the debt or obligation, of
which the note was merely evidence and not a
thing of value or property in itself, and that
there was therefore nothing within the jurisdiction upon which to impose a property tax,
and that no distinction should be made between a
property tax and a succession tax.
23. For example, the taxation of a mortgagee's interest in realty at the same time that
the debt is taxed to the creditor at his domicile
as in Savings and Loan Society v. Multnomah
County, supra note 12; the taxation of shares of
stock both by the domicile of the shareholder as
in Hawley v. Malden, supra note 12; and by the
domicile of the corporation as in Corry v. Baltimore, 196 U.S. 466, 25 S.Ct. 297, 41 LEd. 556
(1905).
24. Supra note 10.
25. Bristol v. Washington County, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. New Orleans, both supra
note 10.
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across the line in state .3 would not seem to prevent state 2 from being the
business situs of those credits. It has been suggested, however, that in all
cases of application of the business situs doctrine the jurisdiction taxing on
that basis has been the domicile of the debtor.26 State 3 would clearly be
permitted to tax the credits represented by notes given by its residents on
the basis of Blackstone v. Miller, which permits a tax solely on the basis
of the state being the domicile of the debtor and being therefore the jurisdiction which will compel the obligor to pay and to whose courts the creditor
will likely be compelled to resort if the debtor refuses to pay. Finally state
4, to which all of the notes and mortgages have been sent and in which they
are being kept more or less permanently, apparently could tax the transfer of all the credits on the basis of Wheeler v. Sohmer. In addition to all
these it might be suggested that if a resident of state 3 had given as security
for his note a mortgage on land in state 5, and had state 5 had a statute requiring that the interest of the mortgagee be taxed as realty, this state also
might have levied a tax on the basis of the doctrine of Savings & Loan So27
ciety v. Multnomah County.
Thus some of the credits in the above stated situations might conceivably be subjected to a tax by four or even five different jurisdictions at the
same time. When one contemplates the results of such 'a situation, the
need for some method, judicial or statutory, of getting relief from multiple
state taxation becomes a very pressing one. There is little difficulty in
agreeing with the Court that "such a startling possibility suggests a wrong
premise. ' ' 28 Such was the status of the taxation of intangibles when the
first of the three recent cases above mentioned2 1 came up for consideration.
Two conceivable methods of striking at the undoubted evils which inhere
in such a situation suggest themselves. First, statutory action by the states
by means of which some uniformly accepted doctrine can be established, or
universal reciprocal exemption laws be adopted. Second, judicial denial of
the power to tax under some of the; situations here involved.
For several years the various states have been making some effort
through means of reciprocal exemption laws to eliminate these evils, but
with only a limited degree of success. Particularly have the efforts in this
direction been noteworthy since the decision of the Frick case in 1925 eliminated effectively multiple state taxation as to tangibles."
26. Powell, The Business Situs of Credits
(1922)
28 W.VA.L.Q. 89, 104. Mr. Powell
further suggests (p. 108) that the place where
the business is conducted should alone control.
See Hutchinson v. Board of Equalization of City
of Oskaloosa, supra note 10, where no distinetion was made between loans made in the state
and loans made to residents of another state.
27. Supra note 12. For a statement of the
case see infra note 125.

28. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota,
supra note 16, at 209.
29. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of IBaltimore
v. Virginia, supra note 15; Farmers Loan &
Trust Co. v. Minnesota, supra note 16; and
Baldwin v. Mo., supra note 17.
30. For an account of the progress made in
this work see Brady, Statutory Solution of Multipie Death Taxation (1927) 13 A.B.A.J. 147;
Nossman, The Fourteenth Amendment in its
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Remedy by the second suggested method is calculated to be much more
effective if there is sufficient basis for such judicial determination. It is
uniformly well recognized that no state may tax anything over which it has
no jurisdiction without violating the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.31 "The power of taxation, however vast in its character and
searching in its extent, is necessarily limited to subjects within the jurisdic3' 2
tion of the state. These subjects? are persons, property, and business.
* * cases like Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky and others have
gone far toward establishing the proposition that tangible personal property
cannot, conformably to due process of law, have a situs for taxation in more
than one state at a given time, not because the specific constitutional provisions against double taxation apply to such a case, but because the facts
necessary to give the property a situs for taxation in one state necessarily
negative the requisites of a situs for taxation in another." 33
In dealing with intangible property, however, great difficulty is encountered in determining which state has and which state has not the requisite jurisdiction. Such property interests, it is clear, can have no actual
physical situs of their own in the same sense that a tangible chattel has such
a situs. After the decision of Blackstone v. Miller, and particularly beginning with Wheeler v. Sohrmer, much was said about chattelized choses and
the ability of the paper evidence of a debt to acquire the character of a
tangible for purposes of being given an independent situs of its own as a
basis for taxation. 4 Whether this was ultimately to result in destroying the
power of the state of the domicile to tax, or whether both were to continue
to tax, appeared to be highly uncertain.
The decision of the Frick case in 1925, restricting taxation of the
transfer of tangibles to a single jurisdiction, as above mentioned, was expressly limited in its application to tangibles, no effort being made to overturn
the established principles by means of which intangibles, or their transfer,
were frequently taxed in two or more jurisdictions at the same time. Nevertheless, the contention was frequently set tip after this decision, on the basis
of Mr. Justice Holmes' assertion in Wheeler v. Sohmer that "It is well setRelation to State Taxation of Intangibles (1930)
18 CALIF. L.REV. 345, 362n,; PRENTICEHALL,
INHERITANCE
TAX
SERVICE
(1930) 701; Note (1930) 69 A.L.R. 949. It is
stated in the Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. case
that "perhaps two-thirds of the states have en.
deavored to avoid the evil by resort to reciprocal
exemption laws." supra note 16, at 209.
31. State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, supra
note 8, at'319; Louisville & Jeffersonville Ferry
Co. v. Kentucky, supra note 2, at 396, 398;
Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Ry. Co. v.
Pennsylvania, supra note 2, at 358; Union Re.
frigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, supra note 1,

at 204; Prick v. Pennsylvania, supra note 3, at
492; and many other cases.
32. State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, sapra
note 8, at 319; "The power of taxation by any
state is limited to persons, property, and business within its jurisdiction." Tappan v. Merchant's Nat'l Bank, supra note 12, at 499; New
York, Lake Erie & Western Ry. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 153 U.S. 628, 646, 14 S.Ct. 952, 38 L.Ed.
846 (1894).
33. Situs, as Between Different States or
Countries, of Personal Property for Purposes of
Property Taxation, L.R.A. 1915 C. 903, 906.
34. Supra notes 6 and 7.
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tled that municipal bonds are in such tangible concrete form that they may
be taxed where found, etc.," and that notes should be treated the same, that
such bonds and notes should now be treated as completely chattelized and
taxable only where found as had become the case with ordinary chattels.
This attempt to attribute tangibility to the paper evidence of such a property interest, in so far as it may have been hoped by some to establish a situs
for taxation on the same basis as tangibles under the doctrine of the Frick
case, was definitely exploded and set at rest by the unanimous decision of
the United States Supreme Court in the case of Blodgett v. Silberman.
There were involved, among other items of property, certain United States
bonds and treasury certificates of indebtedness of the United States kept
in New York but belonging to a decedent domiciled in Connecticut. In
upholding a transfer tax in Connecticut, the Court definitely repudiated
the notion contended for to the effect that such bonds, payable to bearer
and transferable from hand to hand, had lost their character as choses in
action and taken on the qualities of physical property and could be taxed
only where found. The decision in this case constituted a very definite step
in the general direction of ending multiple state taxation of intangibles,
though its effect was not to be fully appreciated until the determination of
the later cases of Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota and Baldwin v.
Missouri. It announced no new doctrine, but it served to allay any possible
doubt as to the continued taxability of bonds and other credits represented
by paper evidence as intangibles at the domicile of the owner, regardless of
what theory of tangibility of such paper evidence might be applied by the
state in which the paper evidence chanced to be held. 5 It appeared to be
the definitely approved doctrine of the Supreme Court by this case that all
such obligations evidenced by bonds or other negotiable instruments are
primarily choses. Despite any popular conception, business usage.3 or historical tradition, 7 they are still choses and taxable at the domicile of the
owner on the basis of the maxim mobilia sequuntur personam as are other
intangibles. Thus if relief from multiple state taxation of intangibles was
to be had it' seemed that it must be other than the state of the owner's
domicile that must yield. The door seemed definitely closed to any extension of the doctrine of the Frick case in this direction.
35.
"It is not enough to show that the written or printed evidence of ownership may, by
the law of the state in which they are physically
present, be permitted to be taken in execution
or dealt with as reaching that of which they are
evidence, even without the presence of the
owner. While bonds often are so treated, they
are nevertheless in their essence only evidences of

debt."
Blodgett v. Silberman, supra note 14, at
14, citing Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U.S. 491,
25 L.Ed. 558 (1879).
36. Holmes, J., in Wheeler v. Sohmer, sfipra
note 5, at 439.
37. Ibid. 438; ]Blackstone v. Miller, supra
note 8, at 206.
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RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
The first of the group of recent tax cases, which are among the most
epoch-making decisions by the Supreme Court in the history of tax litigation in this country, is that of Safe Deposit and Trust Company of Baltimore v. Virginia.28 The court there used language which indicated very
forcibly a determination to establish limitations upon the multiple state taxation of intangible property.

"Tangible personal property permanently located beyond the owner's
domicile may not be taxed at the latter place [citing Union Transit and
Frick cases] . .

.

.The reasons which led this court . . . [in those cases] to

deny application of the maxim mobilia sequuntur personam to tangibles
apply to the intangibles in appellant's possession. They have acquired a
situs separate from that of the beneficial owners. The adoption of a contrary rule would 'involve possibilities of an extremely serious character'
by permitting double taxation, both unjust and oppressive, and the fiction
of mobilia sequuntur personam was intended for convenience, and not to
be controlling where justice does not demand it ....It would be unfortunate,
perhaps amazing, if a legal fiction originally invented to prevent personalty
from escaping just taxation should compel us to accept the irrational view
that the same securities were within two states at the same instant and be1 9
cause of this to uphold a double and oppressive assessment.
While the decision in this case did not overturn any past decisions or
fundamentally change existing law, it served to indicate the purpose of the
Court and paved the way for the more far-reaching decisions soon to
follow.
The decision in Farmers Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota,40 in denying to Minnesota the right to tax the transfer of its state and municipal
bonds owned by a decedent domiciled in New York and kept in that state,
and in squarely and expressly overruling Blackstone v. Miller,41 marks a most
38. Supra, note 15. A resident of Virginia
transferred to the Safe Deposit and Trust Co.
of Baltimore, Maryland, certain stocks and bonds
to be there held in trust for his two sons, also
residents of Virginia, to be divided betwen said
sons upon arrival at stated ages. The donor
reserved s power of revocation in himself but
died without exercising it. The Virginia Special Court of Appeals had sustained a property
tax upon the entire trust estate assessed under
a Virginia statute to the trustee. This decision
the United States Supreme Court reversed, Mr.
Justice Holmes dissenting. The Court dealt
solely with the question whether the corpus of
the trust had a situs in Virginia for tax purposes, on the basis of the bneficial owners being
domiciled there, and held that its situs was
with the trustee in Maryland and that the Vir-

ginia tax violated the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
39. Ibid. 93, 94.
40. Supra note 16. One Taylor died domiciled in New York. He owned and kept in
New York negotiable bonds and certificates of
indebtedness issued by the state of Minnesota
and the cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul.
Some were registered, others were payable to
bearer. All passed under his will probated in
New York and were subjected to a transfer tax
by New York. A tax by Minnesota upon the
transfer was upheld by the State Supreme Court
(In re Estate of Taylor, 176 Minn. 634. 222
N.W. 528, 1928), relying upon Blackstone v.
Miller. The Minnesota Court at first held the
tax invalid (175 Minn. 310, 219 N.W. 153,
1928), treating the bonds as tangibles and by
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significant step in the curtailment of multiple state taxation and in the

elimination of the pre-existing evils. The court repudiated entirely the
contention that the obligations, being those of the state of Minnesota and
its municipalities, created by its law, subject to its control, given validity,
protected and enforced by its law, must be subject to its taxing power.
"In this court" we are told, "the presently approved doctrine is that no state
may tax anything not within her jurisdiction without violating the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 2 With an undoubted purpose to bring the intangible
property here involved within the same limitations of the constitution as
previously had been applied to tangibles, the Court asserted:
"While debts have no actual territorial situs, we have ruled that a state
may properly apply the rule mobilia sequuntur personam and treat them
as localized at the creditor's domicile for taxation purposes. Tangibles
with permanent situs therein, and their testamentary transfer, may be taxed
only by the state where they are found. And, we think, the general reasons
declared sufficient to inhibit taxation of them by two states apply under
present circumstances with no less force to intangibles with taxable situs
imposed by due application of the legal fiction.

' 43

While the court based its denial of the power of the debtor state to
tax in this case upon the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
no doubt the desire or determination to cope with the ever increasing evil of
multiple state taxation in such cases, as a matter of policy and fairness, was
to a considerable extent responsible for the holding that Blackstone v. Miller
must be overruled, and that a state has no right to tax merely by virtue of
being the debtor's domicile. Such a decision did not come as a surprise.
The doctrine of the Blackstone case had never attained anything like universal approval, had always been subjected to criticism, and certainly reached a highly undesirable result by adding to the already too great possibilities
of so-called double taxation. Courts had frequently held theretofore, as a
matter of statutory construction, that the mere fact that the debtor was a
resident of the state did not bring an indebtedness due to a non-resident,
or his estate, within the provision of a statute calling for a tax upon all propapplication of the doctrine of the Frick case taxable only where found. After the decision of
Blodgett v. Silberman the court took the position that the bonds were mere choses, and as
debts owned by Minnesota and its municipalities
were subject to its control, its laws gave them
validity, protected them, provided the means
of enforcement, and thus the state could tax.
41.
Blackstone had died domiciled in Illinois
leaving property consisting of a debt of $10,000
owned by a New York firm and a deposit of
$4,000,000 in a New York trust company. The
transfer was taxed at the domicite in Illinois
and again by New York under a statute im-

posing such a tax with respect to "any property
within the state." The United States Supreme
Court upheld the latter tax in an 6pinion by
Mr. Justice Holmes, emphasizing primarily the
control over the debtor at his domicile as being
a proper basis on which to tax. The Court
said, at 205, "But it is plain that the transfer
does depend upon the law of New York, not
because of any theoretical speculation concerning the whereabouts of the debt, but because of
the practical fact of its power over the person
of the debtor."
42. Supra note 16, at 210.
43. Ibid. 211.
(Italics the writer's)
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erty within the state or upon the transfer of such property.14 And while
those cases did not generally assert the lack of constitutional power to so
tax, it was no doubt thought to be a matter not entirely free from doubt despite the Blackstone case.4 5 This case is even stronger than the ordinary
case of an attempt to tax at the domicile of the debtor, by virtue of the fact
that the debts here in question were represented by negotiable bonds and
certificates of indebtedness issued by the state of Minnsota and its municipalities. Some of the bonds were registered and a transfer would apparently involve a transfer on the books of registry within the state. Furthermore,
the debtor in this case was not only within the jurisdiction of the state seeking to tax but was the state itself, the very power which created and gave
validity and enforceability to the debt. Also unlike the case of an individual
debtor who may be sued wherever he can be found, suit to collect on these
obligations could only be brought in the state of Minnesota. This, however, was not thought to be a sufficient basis on which to sustain the tax.
The Court makes the very definite and very important assertion that under
present conditions the reasons thought to be sufficient to prevent multiple
state taxation of tangibles as held in the Union Transit case and the Frick
case likewise require the abandonment of similar multiple state taxation of intangibles. The further assertion is also made that since such intangibles are
held to be taxable at the owner's domicile, they are taxable there only.4" The
Court also says, "taxation is an intensely practical matter and laws should be
construed and applied with a view to avoid so far as possible unjust and oppressive consequences." This indicates that the Court is deeply concerned
with the matter of policy, which it ordinarily disclaims any right to consider.4 7 And while that reference, were it standing alone, might be con44. Chambers v. Mumford, 187 Cal. 228, 201
P. 588 (1921); Walker v. People, 64 Colo. 143,
171 P. 747 (1918); People v. Blair, 276 IlI. 623,
115 N.E. 218 (1917); Gilbertson v. Oliver, 129
Iowa 568, 105 N.W. 1002 (1906); Dodge County v. Burns, 89 Nebr. 534, 131 NW. 922 (1911);
Matter of Fearing, 200 N.Y. 340, 93 N.E. 956
(1911); In re Lowell's Estate, 208 App. Div.
201, 202 N.Y.S. 312 (1924); Tax Commission
of Ohio v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. of New
York City, 119 Ohio St. 410, 1-64 N.E. 423
(1928); Fuller et al v. South Carolina Tax
Commission, 128 S.C. 14, 121 S.E. 478 (1924);
McLaughlin ct al v. Cluff, 66 Utah 245, 240
P. 161 (1925); Commonwealth v. Huntington,
148 Va. 97, 138 S.E. 650 (1927).
See State
ex rel. American Automobile Ins. Co. v. Gehier et al, 320 Mo. 702, 8 S.W. (2d) 1057 (1928):
State ex rel. American Central Ins. Co. v.
Cehner et al, 320 Mo. 901, 9 S.W. (2d) 621
(1928).
42 A.L.R. 354, 357;
45. See notes (1926)
(1930) 65 A.L.R. 1008.

46.

"We have determined that in general in-

tangibles may, be properly taxed at the domicile
of their owner, and we can find no sufficient
reason for saying that they are not entitlel to
enjoy immunity against taxation at more than
one place similar to that accorded to tangibles."
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, sitpra
note 16, at 212.
47.
Calder v. Brull, 3 DalI, 386, 399, 1 L.Ed.
648 (1798); Bennett v. Boggs, 3 Fed. Cas. (C.
C.N.J.) 221, 227, 228, Fed. Cas. No. 1319 (1830);
Booth v. Illinois, 184 U.S. 425, 431, 432, 22 S.Ct.
425, 46 L.Ed. 623 (1902) ; Otis and Gassman v.
Parker, 187 U.S. 606, 608, 609, 23 S.Ct. 168,
47 LEd. 323 (1903) ; McCray v. United States
197 U.S. 27, 54, 24 S.Ct. 769, 49 LEd. 78
(1904); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11,
31, 25 S.Ct. 358, 49 LEd. 643 (1905); McLean
v. Arkansas, 211 U.S. 539, 547, 548, 29 S.Ct.
206, 53 LEd. 315 (1909); Chicago, Burlington
& Quincy Ry. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549,
569, 31 S.Ct. 259, 55 LEd. 328 (1911): German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389,
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strued as having application only to the matter of statutory construction,
considerations of policy were no doubt important factors in influencing the
mind of the Court in this case. Also the Court said, comparing with and
quoting from the Union Transit case, "and certainly existing conditions no
less imperatively demand protection of choses in action against multiplied
taxation [than tangibles in the Union Transit case] whether following misapplication of some legal fiction [as mobilia sequuntur personam in the
Union Transit case] or conflicting theories concerning the sovereign's right
to exact contributions." This would seem to indicate clearly that a desire
to avoid double taxation was an important if not the controlling factor.

Significant as was the decision in the Farmers Loan and Trust Co. case,
it was soon to be followed by a decision of more far-reaching consequence.
In the case of Baldwin v. Missouri there were involved deposits in Missouri
banks, coupon bonds issued by the United States and kept in Missouri, and
notes executed by residents of Missouri, secured by mortgages upon Missouri land and kept in Missouri, all owned by a decedent domiciled in Illinois.
The power of Missouri to tax the transfer of this property was denied.
If, after Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, there was anything
left of Blackstone v. Miller on the theory that money in the bank is like
money in the pocket and so to be treated as a tangible, 48 it is clearly destroyed
by Baldwin v. Missouri, where the identical situation with respect to bank
deposits was involved and the Court held that such deposits, or their transfer, 40 could not be taxed in Missouri where deposited. Such a result is
certainly highly desirable as a practical means of avoiding double taxation,
and in so far, at least, as it might be applied to a property tax, it is, perhaps,
quite sustainable as well. Such a deposit is clearly a debt owing from the
bank to the depositor. It is an intangible and nothing more, and there appears to be no reason for treating it differently from other intangibles
which, on the application of the maxim mobilia sequuntur personam, are
taxable at the domicile of the owner. To treat such a deposit otherwise
would seem to lose sight of its fundamental character as a debt.
The case also carries the converse of the situation in Blodgett v. Silber414-417, 34 S.Ct. 612, 58 LEd. 1011 (1914).
"Questions of policy are not submitted to judicial determination . . . . With the wisdom of
such legislation and the soundness of the coonomic policy involved we are not concerned,
Whether it will result in good or barm it is not
within our province to inquire." Green v. Frazier,
253 U.S. 233, 240, 40 S,Ct. 499. 64 LEd. 878
(1920). See also, Mr. Justice Holmes' dissent in
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75, 25 S.Ct.
539, 49 L.Ed. 937 (1905) ; Mr. Chief Justice
Taft's and Mr. Justice Holmes' dissents in
Adkins v. Children's Hospital of the District of

Columbia, 261 U.S. 525, 562 and 570, 43 S.Ct.
394, 67 L.Ed. 785 (1923).
48. One basis upon which Mr. Justice Holmes'
opinion purported to sustain the tax was that
cash on hand would be tangible and taxable and
the mere fact of its having been deposited in a
bank should not make any difference; that according to the business man's conception money
in the bank is the same as money in the pocket
and that the practical similarity has largely
obliterated the legal differences.
49. The tax involved was one upon the transfer by inheritance.
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man with respect to bonds" ° to its logical conclusion by holding that bonds
and notes, or their transfer, cannot be taxed merely by virtue of their presence on any theory of attributing to them a character of tangibility, but are
taxable and only taxable at the domicile of their owner. This gives the added
significance to the case of Blodgett v. Silberman previously referred to as not
being fully apparent until the decision of these later cases. It also appears to
have the effect of completely overruling the case of Wheeler v. Sohmer,
though curiously enough, that case was not even mentioned by the majority. 5
The doctrine, repeatedly asserted by way of dictum, 5 2 that government bonds

are in such concrete tangible form as to be treated as ordinary chattels and
taxed where found, seems to be definitely relegated to the judicial scrap heap.
These cases have gone far to eliminate the evils of multiple state taxation of intangibles, and from the practical standpoint of reaching a just, fair,
and highly desirable result the Court deserves the highest commendation.
The doctrine of Blackstone v. Miller with respect to bank deposits,
whether from the standpoint of being debts and taxable at the domicile of
the debtor, or of money in the bank being assimilated in the popular mind
to money in the pocket and taxable as a tangible where found, it is submitted, never rested on a very sound basis. In sc far as the deposit is
likened to money in the pocket, it is based on an entire misconception of
the legal relation existing between banks and their depositors and would not
seem to be a sufficient justification for such a tax. From the standpoint
of taxing at the domicile of the debtor perhaps more can be said for the tax.
5
However, it is clear that it is the credit, not the debt, that is being taxed. 3
It is property only in the hands of the creditor,5 4 and, according to the
well established doctrine, the tax can be sustained only if there be jurisdiction over the person or the property. There is obviously no jurisdiction
over the person of the creditor in such a case. As to whether jurisdiction
over the credit exists at the domicile of the debtor there is more room for
difference of opinion. Clearly the credit has no actual physical situs as has a
chattel. Absent the consideration of business situs, it must have its legal
situs at the domicile of the creditor or the debtor. Since there is no res
upon which the tax can be levied or which can be made liable for its payment, the tax is in its nature a personal one and the creditor's domicile alone
has jurisdiction over the person. The thing of value appears to rest with
50. There a tax at the domicile of the owner
was sustained despite the claim that bonds should
be treated as tangibles and taxable only where
found in accordance with the doctrine of the
Frick case.
51. Whether or not the facts were identical
with those in Wheeler v. Sohmer is not entirely
clear. It appears highly probable, however, that
the notes and bonds were being kept more or

less permanently in Missouri and if that be
true no basis for distinguishing the two cases
would seem to exist.
52. Supra note 8.
53. Goldgart v. People, supra, note 10, at
29; Buck v. Miller, 147 Ind. 586, 589, 45 N.E.
647 (1896).
54. State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, supra
note 8, at 320.
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the creditor at his domicile. He deals with it, may transfer it, and no part
of the asset seems to exist with the debtor. The mere fact that the creditor
may find it necessary to invoke the aid of the courts of the debtor's domicile,
which may or may not be the jurisdiction in which and under whose laws
the obligation was incurred, in order to collect would not seem to be controlling. Likewise, he may invoke the aid of the courts in any other jurisdiction
in which he may find the debtor and such surely could not give that state
a basis upon which to tax. The further fact that the domicile of the debtor
may have jurisdiction for certain other purposes, for example, garnishment,
would not seem to add measurably to the plausibility of the contention that
it should also have the power to tax. The power to tax rests on a fundamentally different basis from that of garnishment. Any state, whether it be
his domicile or not, wherein the debtor may be found, however temporarily,
may exercise the control necessary for garnishment,55 but obviously enough
should not be permitted to tax. As one writer suggests, "The situs of a
debt for garnishment may move about from day to day as the debtor
migrates. The situs for taxation stays at the domicile of the creditor however far he wanders from his own fireside."501
Perhaps little more can be said by way of justification for the doctrine
of Wheeler v. Sohmer as a practical matter, at least in so far as a property
tax might be concerned. The Court rested its decision in that case largely
upon the analogy. existing between notes and government bonds and relied
upon property tax cases. Mr. Justice Holmes, in upholding the tax on the
transfer of notes solely upon the basis of the paper evidence being witbin
the state, quoted as authority for his position from the opinion of the Court
in New Orleans v. Stempel 57 to the effect that "It is well settled that bank
bills5" and municipal bonds are in such concrete, tangible form that they are
subject to taxation where found, irrespective of the domicile of the owner....
Notes and mortgages are of the same nature .... We see no reason why

a state may not declare that, if found within its limits, they shall be subject to taxation." The first part of this statement with respect to bonds
5
was pure matter of dictum, there being no bonds involved in the case, " and
55. Harris v. Balk, 198, U.S. 215, 25 S.Ct.
625, 49 L.Ed. 1023 (1905).
56. Powell, op. cit. supra note 26, at 91.
57. Supra note 8, at 322, 323.
58. No question seems to arise as to bank
bills. While in last analysis they are only
promises to pay, choses in action, they constitute
a medium of exchange and circulate as money
and are regarded the same as coin. Blodgett
v. Silberman, stupra note 14, at 18.

property which has a visible and tangible existence, and not the domicile or the owner, will,
in many cases, determine the state In which
it may be taxed. The same thing is true of
public securities consisting of state bonds or
bonds of municipal bodies and circulating notes
of banking institutions; the former by general
usage have acquired a character of, and are treated as, property in the place where they are found,
though removed from the domicile of the own-

59. The Court in New Orleans v. Stempel
relied on State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds,

again the matter of taxing
' er .......There
bonds where found was not before the court

supra note 8, quoting in this connection:

"It

is

undoubtedly true that the actual situs of personal

for

decision.

The

issue

was

merely

whether

the obligor corporation's domicile could tax, the
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the latter part with respect to bills and notes had to do with a case in which
the instruments in question had acquired a business situs,60 and the case has
always been taken to rest on the business situs basis.61 All of the other cases
cited in the same connection for this proposition are clearly business situs
cases. 2 It is further stated in the opinion that "it has been asserted or implied again and again, that the states had power to deal with negotiable paper on the footing of situs."'I No doubt such assertions by way of dictum
can be found in plenty but few if any well-considered decisions.6 4 Certainly
this i:s
true in so far as the levy of a property tax is concerned. The language of the Court would seem equally as applicable-in the case of a property tax as in that of a transfer tax, though only the latter was there involved, and the Court by its reference to Buck v. Beach6 5 indicated that it
then considered a distinction might be taken between the two and a succession or transfer tax upheld in cases where the levy of a property tax
would not be sustained. It is also to be noted that the broad general
doctrine of Mr. Justice Holmes which appeared to be intended to apply
to both types of taxes alike was approved by only a minority of the Court.66
If it is now true, as the Court seems to indicate, that there is no difference
7
in the jurisdictional basis requisite for a succession tax and a property tax,
and the problem is to be approached from the standpoint of a property tax,
there appears to be every reason from the practical standpoint to agree with
the decision of the Court in the Baldwin case. After all, the property
interest, the thing of value, is the credit and not the note or bond by which
it is evidenced. True it is that the note or bond may be negotiable and pass
from hand to hand even without indorsement. The conception of the ordinary man may be that when he has the paper evidence he has the thing of
value. 8 However, it is well recognized that the paper evidence may be
bonds being held outside the state at the domicile
of their owners. The assertion has only the
force of dictum.
60. The notes in question were given by
residents of New Orleans, secured by mortgages
upon Nev Orleans realty, and kept in New
Orleans by an agent of the non-resident owner.
The agent collected the interest and principal
when due and deposited it and apparently reinvested the money in further loans.
61. The Court throughout relied upon and
quoted from business situs cases and emphasized the reinvestment feature. The case has
since been considered one of the leading businss
situs cases.
62. Bristol v. Washington County, State Assessors v. Comptoir National d'Escompte, and
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. New Orleans, all
.nupra note 10.

63.
64.
65.

Wheeler v. Sohmer, supra note 5, at 439.
Supra notes 8 and 59.
206 U.S. 392, 27 S.Ct. 712, 51 L.Ed.

1106 (1907). The Court said, p. 440: "A distinction was taken [in Buck v. Beach] between
the presence sufficient for a succession tax like
that in this case, and that required for a property tax such as then before the court, and the
only point decided was that the notes had no
such presence in Indiana as to warrant a prop.
erty tax."
66. See note 22, sopra
67. This problem is discussed infra. p. 47ff.
68. Mr. Justice Holmes, in Wheeler v. Sobmer, p. 438, 439, after referring to the argument that the reason for taxing bonds where
found was "due to the survival of primitive
notions that identified the obigations with the
parchment or paper upon which they were written" suggests that, "It is not primitive tradi.
tion alone that gives their peculiarities to bonds,
but a tradition laid hold of, modified and adapted
to the convenience and understanding of business men. The same convenience and understanding apply to bills and notes."
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lost or destroyed and yet the amount of the debt with interest may be recovered."9 The thing of value remains despite the destruction of its paper
representation. That being true, there seems little justification for saying
that credits represented by such paper evidence have become chattels and
must be treated accordingly. They are primarily intangibles, whether they
be represented by notes or bonds, and, are properly treated like other intangibles as having their existenced with their owner at his domicile. If a
note or bond kept elsewhere than at the owner's domicile were accidentally
destroyed, the obligation would still remain and be collectable. It is contended that before the destruction it should be taxable where kept. After
destruction, certainly it could no longer be contended that it would be taxable at the former resting place of the paper evidence. Its nature as a
thing of value to the obligee or payee would remain unchanged, a chose
and intangible before as well as after the destruction. The mere existence
or destruction of the paper evidence would neither seem to affect its nature
nor change its location for tax purposes from one jurisdiction to another.
It is sometimes suggested 70 that a refusal to permit a tax where the
paper evidence may be found, or where the debtor is domiciled, or where
bank deposits are kept, may result in the property interests involved escaping taxation. altogether and that this danger of escape more than counterbalances any injustice in double taxation which may result from an opposite
holding. 71 Such a contention does not appear to be plausible. Every tax
must rest upon its own bottom, and if one state has not the requisite jurisdiction to sustain an. exercise of its taxing power in a particular case the
mere fact that the state which does have jurisdiction fails to tax because of
secretion by the owner or otherwise will not confer a power where it did not
72
exist before.
There would seem to be little disposition to dispute the entire desirability of the position taken by the majority of the Court in these cases.
The dissent of Mr. Justice Holmes on constitutional grounds, however, is
not entirely without foundation. Particularly may it so appear if one view
the situation from the earlier notion of a transfer tax being on an entirely
different basis from that of a property tax. However desirable the result
of these cases may be from the standpoint of policy and as a practical solution of the difficulties of double taxation, it is to be borne in mind that not
69. Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, supra note 35, at
498.
70. Baldwin v. Missouri, supra note 17, at
593, 594; also Mr, Justice Stone's dissent, at
598.
71. "If this occasionally results in double
taxation, it much oftener happens that this class
of property escapes altogether. In the case of
intangible property, the law does not look for

absolute equality, but to the much more practical consideration of collecting the tax upon
such property, either in the state of the domicileor the situs."
Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, supra note 1, at 205.
72. Cf. Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S.
230, 46 S.Ct. 260, 70 LEd. 557 (1926); Coinmonwealth v. West India Oil Refining Co., supra
note 11, at 834.
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only are they important decisions with respect to matters of taxation but
with respect to certain problems of constitutional law as well. By their
holdings a very definite step is taken by way of limitation upon the power of
73
the states.
Under our system of government the states have such powers as are
not denied to them. No question of encroachment upon any federal power
is involved in this situation. The question then must be whether or not
the state in claiming the power to exact a tax in the various situations involved in these cases is acting so far arbitrarily that the exaction constitutes
a deprivation' of property without due process of law in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. It has been too long held, to be successfully disputed now, that a tax without jurisdiction violates the due process clause.7 4
But what determines the existence or non-existence of jurisdiction in these
cases? Frequently such intangible property interests occupy such a relation to more than one state as to seem to justify a tax by each. Jurisdiction
cannot be made to depend upon the finding of an actual physical situs as in
the case of tangibles. By application of the fiction mobilia sequuntur personat the courts have given them a situs at the domicile of their owner.
But, however widely recognized and universally acquiesced in, it is only a
fiction, and the courts so recognize.7 5 Since a debt, for example, in the
very nature of things, can have no actual physical situs in the same sense
that a tangible has such situs, the technical or legal situs, so far as one is to
73.

"It

seems to me that the result reached

by the court probably is a desirable one, but I
hardly understand how it can be deduced from
the
Fourteenth
Amendment."
Mr.
fustice
Holmes' dissent in Union Refrigerator Transit
Co. v. Kentucky.
"I have not yet adequately expressed the more
than anxiety that I feel at the ever increasing
scope given to the Fourteenth Amendment in
cutting down what I believe to be the constitutional rights of the states. As the decisions
now stand I see hardly any limit but the sky to
the invalidating of those rights if they happen
to strike a majority of this Court as for any
reason undesirable. I cannot believe that the
Amendment was intended to give us carte blanche
to embody our economic or moral beliefs in its
prohibitions. Yet I can think of no narrower
reason that seems to me to justify the present
and the earlier decisions to which I have referred [Safe Deposit & Trust Co, v. Virginia, and
Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota]. Of
course the words 'due process of law' if taken
in their literal meaning have no application to
this case; and while it is too late to deny that
they have been given a much more extended and
artificial signification, still we ought to remember the great caution shown by the constitution

in limiting the power of the states, and should
be slow to construe the clause in the Fourteenth
Amendment as committing to the Court's own
discretion, the validity of whatever laws the
states may pass."
Mr. Justice Holmes' dissent
in Baldwin v. Missouri, at 595.
74. Supra note 31. But see Mr. Justice
Holmes' dissent in the Unio Transit case, supra
note 73.
75. "For many purposes the domicile of the
owner is deemed the situs of his personal property. This, however, is only a fiction [Italics
the writer's] from motives of convenience, and
is not of universal application, but yields to the
actual situs of the property where justice requires that it should."
Bristol v. Washington
County, supra note 10, at 141; Pullman Palace
Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18, 22, I1
S.Ct. 876, 35 LEd. 613 (1891; State Board of
Assessors v. Comptoir National d'Escompte, supra
note 10, at 404; Union Refrigerator Transit Co.
v. Kentucky, sutpra note I, at 197; Pooipleton v.
Yambill County, supra note 11, at 382; Endicott,
Johnson & Co. v. Multnomah County, 96 Ore.
679, 684, 190 P. 1109 (1920); Union Refrigerator
Transit Co. v. Lynch, 18 Utah 378, 386, 55 p.
639 (1898); and many other cases.
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be attributed to it, must of necessity be determined by some technical rule,
maxim, or theory-by fiction. That being true, can it be said that there
is anything purely arbitrary in the action of a state in failing or refusing
to give universal application to the fiction mobilia sequuntur persoivam?
Who can say that the property in a debt is actually in one state rather than
in another ? If it is not thus localized is it beyond the constitutional power of
a state to adopt a theory, however undesirable it may be from the standpoint
of avoiding multiple state taxation, that the presence of the paper evidence
in the form of a note or bond within the state, and the state's control over
such paper evidence, constitutes as satisfactory a basis for attributing to
that intangible a situs as does the more widely adopted fiction, and on that
basis assert its right to levy a tax? Particularly may this seem to be true
in the case of a transfer tax when the transfer may be effected through
ancillary letters of administration in that state, whether it be made in accordance with the will of the testator or the intestate laws of his domicile.
The determination that such action on the part of a state is so far arbitrary
as to be a denial of due process is perhaps not to be reached without some
76

degree of difficulty.

If it can be said that the requirement that one must pay a tax in two
jurisdictions with respect to the same property interest is in itself so far
arbitrary as to amount to a denial of due process, then the problem is greatly
simplified and the duty devolves upon the Court to determine which jurisdiction has the better basis for a right to tax and thus which state must
yield in order to avoid the unconstitutional result. Yet in the case of tangibles the tax in a second state is apparently, if judged by the assertions of
the Court, not held bad simply because it results in double taxation and
another state has a better basis on which to tax, but rather on the ground
that jurisdiction over the property is entirely lacking and that a tax without jurisdiction is a denial of due process.7 7 Then if the problem as to intangibles be approached in the same fashion great difficulty is experienced in
entirely eliminating any basis for the assertion of jurisdiction in all states
save the domicile of the owner, especially as noted above with regard to
76. See Mr. Justice Holmes' dissents, particularly in Baldwin v. Missouri, in which he
says: "Very probably it might be good policy
to restrict taxation to a single place; and perhaps
the technical conception of domicile may be the
best determinant. But it seems to me that if that
result is to be reached it should be reached
through understanding among the states, by uniform legislation or otherwise, not by evoking
a constitutional prohibition from the void of
'due process of law' when logic, tradition and
authority have united to declare the right of
the state to lay the now prohibited tax." See
also supra note 73.

77. State Tax on Foreign Held Flonds, supra
note 8, at 319, 325, 326; Louisville & Jeffersonville Ferry Co. v. Kentucky, supra note 2, at
396; Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Ry. Co.
v. Pennsylvania, supra note 2, at 356; Union
Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, supra
note 1, at 204; Western Union Telegraph Co.
v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 38, 30 S.Ct. 190, 54 L.Ed.
355 (1910) ; International Paper Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 135, 142, 38 S.Ct. 292, 62
L.Ed. 624 (1918); Frick v. Pennsylvania, supra
note 3, at 489. See supra p. 11 and note 33.
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transfer taxes where ancillary administration may be employed in completing the transfer. *Perhaps it is not so much the lack of jurisdiction in the
one state, however, as the desire to get away from double taxation, that has
been largely responsible for the holdings, both as to tangibles and intangibles,
especially as to the latter. Even in the Union Transit case with respect to
tangibles, probably the desire to avoid the injustice of double taxation largely influenced the Court. 78 No doubt the same may be said of the decision
with respect to a transfer tax on tangibles in the Frick case. 79 It is very
clear that such property being permanently located within a state, that state
may tax the transfer whether it apply its own law or by comity the law of
the decedent's domicile in effecting the transfer. Then if the state of the
domicile were permitted to tax that would result in certain double taxation. It seems even more clear in the recent cases that the desire to avoid
the unjust and unfair results of double taxation had a controlling influence.
The Court pointed out in the Farmers Loan & Trust Co. case that perhaps
two-thirds of the states have endeavored to avoid the evil of multiple state
taxation of intangibles by resort to reciprocal exemption laws. As indicative of the fact that matters of policy and conceptions of fairness rather
than absence of jurisdiction, as earlier asserted as a basis for unconstitutionality, was the controlling factor, the Court asserts that "certainly existing
conditions no less imperatively demand protection of choses in action against
multiplied taxation" than is the case with tangible chattels."' Further the
Court says:
"Taxation is an intensely practical matter, and laws in respect of it
should be construed and applied with a view of avoiding, so far as is possible, unjust and oppressive consequences. We have determined that in
general intangibles may be properly taxed at the domicile of their owner, and
we can find no sufficient reason for saving that they are not entitled to cnjoy
an immunity against taxation at more than one place similar to that accorded to tangibles."'
The determining factor in these cases seems to be the Court's con78. Suwra note 1. In that case the Court
said, at 203: "Most modern legislation upon this

"Clearly, it is the objection to double taxation that lies at the root of the Union Refrigera-

subject has been directed . . . to the voidance of

tor Case."

double taxation." At 207, "But in view of the
enormous increase of such property [tangible per-

Taxation (1920) 20 COL. L.REV. 283, 292, 301.
See also, Notes (1930) 16 VA. L.REV. 521, 525;

sonalty] since the introduction of railways and
the growth of manufactures, the tendency has
been in recent years to treat it as having a situs

(1930) 78 U. OF PA. L.REV. 532, 536.
79. "But this is not the first, and will, doubtless, not be the last occasion that the Court's de-

of its own for purposes of taxation, and correlatively to exempt (it) at the domicile of its
owner." At 210, "The adoption of a general

cision is controlled more by broad considerations
of policy than by technical rules of law." Wickersham, Double Taxation (1926) 12 VA. L.REV.

rule

that

tangible

personal

property

in

other

states may be taxed at the domicile of the owner
involves possibilities of an extremely serious
character."

Powell, Extra-territorial Inheritance

185, 189, discussing the rrick case,

80, Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota,
supra note 16, at 211, 212.
81.

Ibid., 212

(Italics the writer's)
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ception of justice and fairness, matters of policy,2 rather than technical

absence of jurisdiction. The Court sympathizes with the feeling of injustice and unfairness consequent upon the taxation of the same economic
interest in two or more jurisdictions at the same time, and realizing the undesirability of continuing that situation calls to its aid the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. It seems that one is driven to the conclusion that the Court is substituting its judgment as to expediency and fairness-matters of policy-for that of the state legislature in order to reach
what it considers a just result and eliminate the evils of multiple state taxation, and in so doing finds its justification in the due process clause, though
it has heretofore repeatedly asserted that such taxation infringed no provision of the United States Constitution.8 3 The Court in so doing certainly reaches a highly desirable result and perhaps its position is not more
difficult to sustain on constitutional grounds than in previous cases where
matters of policy have appeared to influence its decision.84 Yet it does
seem that to require the application of conceptions of justice and fairness to
the extent done by the court in these cases is to inject a new force into the
due process clause. As one state court has suggested, perhaps "judical decisions are to be controlled by the changing demands of trade and commerce
8' 5
and considerations of public policy.
Assuming that there is sufficient constitutional justification for the
holdings in these cases, one can hardly fail to rejoice that so much has been
accomplished in so short a time toward the elimination of the evils of
multiple state taxation of intangibles and their transfer. There are, however. numerous other problems of a similar nature to which it would seem
the Court must turn its attention at an early date. Among these may be
nentioned the application of the doctrine of business situs in conjunction
with the maxim mobilia sequuntur personam; the future application of the
doctrines set forth in such cases as Cream of Wheat Co. v. County of Grand
Forks16 and Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor 7 as they result in
the taxation of the same intangible property interest by two states at the
same time; the taxation of the mortgage interest in realty at the same time
that the credit evidenced by a note and secured by the mortgage is taxed in
82.

See Wickersham,

op. cit. snpra note 79;

S.Ct. 662,

61

LEd.

1336

(1917;

Silverthorne

Lowndes, Tendencies in the Taxation of Intangibles (1930) 17 VA. L.REV. 146, 148, 149;
Note (1931) 5 CIN. L.REV. 245, 250.
83. Supra note 12.
84. Snpra note 79. Ex parte Jackson, 96
U.S. 727, 24 L.Ed. 877 (1877); Boyd v. United

Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 40
S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920); Adkins v.
Children's Hospital, supra note 47.
85. The Court of Appeals of Maryland in
Susquehanna Power Co. v. State Tax Commission, 151 At. 39, 44 (1930).

States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746
(1886); Lockner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 25
S.Ct. 539, 49 LEd. 937 (1905); Coppage v.
Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 35 S.Ct. 240, 59 L.Ed. 441
(1915); Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590, 37

86. Supra note 12.
87. 165 U.S. 194, 17 SCt. 305, 41 L.Ed.
683, 166 U.S. 185, 17 S.Ct. 604, 41 L. Ed.
965 (1897).
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another jurisdiction; and finally, the taxation of shares of corporate stock.
Other situations exist in which similar problems arise but these will suffice for the limits of the present discussion. In most of these situations
the difficulties of eliminating multiple state taxation would not seem to be
more nearly insurmountable than those encountered and disposed of by
the Court in the Farmers Loan & Trust and Baldwin cases.
BUSINESS SITUS
The doctrine known as that of business situs, by means of which credits
may be given a situs for taxation elsewhere than at the domicile of the
creditor when such credits become localized by being made incident to a
business conducted for a non-resident owner, had been accorded a wide
recognition long prior to the determination of the above mentioned recent
cases."" A familiar example was that of a resident of state one by means
of an agent in state two lending money on notes secured by mortgages on
real estate in state two with power in the agent to collect and reinvest or
relend the money as a more or less continuous business in state two. The
credits arising out of such a business were taxable by state two despite the
fact that they might also be taxed at the owner's domicile."' This was true
whether the paper evidence chanced to be kept in state two or elsewhere,9"
and whether the credits were actually evidenced by notes or not.91 If, however, the element of a more or less continuous business were absent, as where
a power of reinvestment was lacking and only the power to collect and transmit was vested in the agent, no business situs was acquired. 9 2 There seems
to be ample justification for sustaining a tax on the basis of business situs.
The non-resident, by means of a resident agent, conducts a continuous and
profitable business within the State. Such business receives the same protection of the state's laws as a similar business conducted by a resident and
there seems to be no reason why it should not be subjected to the same tax.
In view of the very vigorous assertion by the Court in the above mentioned cases that intangibles, like tangibles, are to be subject to only one
tax, the question necessarily arises, which the Court did not purport to discuss or decide, as to which jurisdiction shall prevail in such a casethat of the owner's domicile, or that of the business situs. While the Court
88. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore
v. Virginia, sutra note 15; Farmers' Loan &
Trust Co. v. Minnesota, supra note 16; Baldwin
v. Missouri, supra note 17.
89. Bullen v. Wisconsin, supra note 12, at
631; Fidelity and Columbia Trust Co. v. Louissupra note 12, at 58.
ville,
90. Bristol v. Washington County, and Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. New Orleans, both
supra note

10.

91. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co.
v. Board of Assessors of New Orleans, supra
note 10.
92. Reat v. People, 201 Il1. 469, 66 N.E. 242
(1903). See also Hinckley ct al v. San Diego
County, 49 Cal. App. 668, 194 P. 77 (1920);
Myers v. Seaberger, 45 Ohio St. 232, 12 N.E.
796 (1887).
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definitely asserts that it has "determined that in general intangibles may be
taxed at the domicile of the owner and we find no sufficient reason for
saying that they are not entitled to enjoy an immunity against taxation in
more thanone place similar to that accorded to tangibles," D this does not
necessarily mean that in all cases of intangibles the domicile of the owner is
to control. The Court in these cases definitely recognizes business situs
as a basis for taxation. In the Farmers Loan & Trust Co. case 94 the court
states that"Ne-w Orleans v. Stempe1l" [together with certain other cases] 6
recognizes the principle that choses in action may acquire a situs for taxation other than at the domicile of their owner, if they have become integral
parts of some local business." But the Court further states that "the present
record gives no occasion for us to inquire whether such securities can be
taxed a second time at the owner's domicile" since business situs was not
contended for as a basis for tax in this case. The Court had apparently
precluded any business situs discussion by its statement at the outset that
"none [of the bonds] had any connection with business carried on by or for
the decedent in Minnesota." Again the Court in the Baldwin case appears
to attempt to preclude the necessity of any discussion of business situs and
at the same time perhaps to intimate that that matter is not to be affected
by its decision therein, when it states that "the record discloses nothing tending to show that the personal property had been given a business situs in that
The Court also recognizes quite frankly that the constate [Missouri] .97
trol of the owner's domicile is based on fiction, 9 the maxim mobilia sequntur personam. Then while it is the presently accepted doctrine of the
Supreme Court that ordinarily that state and only that state may tax, yet if
the intangible become so localized as to acquire a definite business situs elsewhere may it not plausibly be argued that the jurisdiction of the owner's
domicile should yield and that of the business situs be permitted to prevail? It was thought that a definite decision as to this matter was to be had
0
The
in the recent case of Beidler et al. v. South Carolina Tax Commission."
93.
94.
95.
96.
pool &

Supra note 81.
Supra note 16, at 213.
Supra note 10.
Bristol v. Washington County, and LiverLondon & Globe Ins. Co. v. f'oard of As-

sessors of New Orleans, both supra note 10.
Supra note 17, at 590. The Missouri
97.
court, State v. Estate of Baldwin, 323 Mo. 207,
213, 19 S.W. (2d) 732 (1929), had said, however, that "it is a reasonable inference that the
cash and notes in such large quantities in Missuri, where none of it was held in Illinois
[domicile of decedent owner], was retained in
this state for the purpose of investment. They
may have established a business situs in this
state . . . . " In this view of the situation Mr.

Justice Stone took the position that the tax
should have been upheld, since the burden is
always upon the one asserting invalidity to so
prove, and further since the Supreme Court
may uphold an act on any'basis that might have
existed, whether or not assigned as the basis
on which the state court upheld it; that since
it may have had a business situs here, it properly
devolved upon the assailants to prove that no
such basis existed if they were to get a decision
invalidating the tax.
98. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota,
supra note 16, at 209, 211.
99. 282 U.S. 1, 51 S.Ct. 54, 75 L.Ed. 69
(1930);
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Court, however, avoided a determination of the matter, saying, "in Farmers
Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota this court reserved the question of business
situs . . ." and "a conclusion that debts have thus acquired a business situs

must have evidence to support it" and the facts as here set forth "afford
no adequate basis for a finding that the indebtedness has a business situs in
South Carolina."' 10 Clearly the Court in these cases has not so much as
intimated that it will not sustain business situs in preference to the owner's
domicile when the issue is squarely presented: as it would seem it must be
in the near future.
The status of the law with respect to certain situations in which tangible property may be found would seem to lend support to the above contention. In the case of tangibles not kept at all times within the state of
the owner's domicile it is to be noted that that jurisdiction may nevertheless
tax under the holdings in cases like New York Central v. Miller.1t But if
such tangibles acquire a situs in another state and are permanently kept
there, they are no longer taxable at the owner's domicile.10 2 In the case of
ship, property the state of the owner's domicile may tax after the theory of
moveables following the domicile of the owner, even though the ships do
not come within the state at any time during the year for which the tax
is levied. 0 3 But if the ship actually acquire a situs within another jurisdiction by being permanently employed there, it at once ceases to be taxable at
the owner's domicile.' 0 4 Thus as asserted by the Supreme Court "the right
of one state to tax may depend somewhat upon the power of another to do
so.

' '
t

Why not say likewise in the case of intangibles ordinarily taxable at

the domicile of the owner, if they acquire a definite situs (business situs) in
100. Ibid. (51 S.Ct., at 55).
101. New York ex rel. New York Central
and Hudson' River Ry. Co. v. Miller, 202 U.S.
584, 26 S.Ct. 714, 50 L.Ed. 1155 (1906). The
state of incorporation was here permitted to tax
all of the rolling stock of the corporation though
much of it was constantly out of the state. There
was no showing, however, that any particular
cars had not been within the state at some time
during the tax year. Whether such property
would still be taxable at the owner's domicile it
it had not been within the jurisdiction at any
time during the year, but had not acquired a
situs for tax elsewhere seems not to have been
squarely decided. The court intimates that
it probably would be in Southern Pacific Company v. Kentucky, 222 U.S. 63, 74, 32 S.Ct.
13, 56 LEd. 96 (1911). The Court said in
Cream of Wheat Co. v. County of Grand Forks,
supra note 11, at 329, "The limitation upon the
power of taxation does not apply even to tangible
perscnal property without the state of the corporation's domicile, if, like a seagoing vessel,
the property has no permanent situs anywhere."

See Lowndes, op. cit. supra note 82, at 152;
Powell, ol,. cit. supra note 78, at 304, 305.
102. Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, supra note 1.
103. Southern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky,
s,pro note 101. Here the ships had not been
within the state at any time during the tax
year and it was asserted that due to the type
of vessel they could not be brought within the
state. They had not, however, acquired a situs
for taxation in any other state, being engaged
in commerce upon the seas.
104. Old Dominion Steamship Co. v. Virginia, 198 U.S. 299, 25 S. Ct. 686, 49 L. Ed.
1059 (1905); Ayer and Lord Tie Co. v. Kentucky. 202 U.S. 409, 26 S.Ct. 679, 50 L.Ed. 1082
(1906); National Dredging Co. v. State, 99 Ala.
462, 12 So. 720 (1893).
105. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, svpra note 16, at 211, on the authority
of Southern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, supra note
101.
"Ordinarily this court recognizes that the
fiction of mobilia sequwntur personant may be
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another jurisdiction, that they shall no longer be taxable at the owner's
domicile but that it shall give way to the jurisdiction of the situs ? As in the
ship case it is given a situs at the owner's domicile by way of fiction, a debt
having no actual physical sittis like tangible property, and also as in the ship
case when an actual situs is acquired elsewhere, the jurisdiction of the
domicile should yield. As is sometimes stated, the fiction must yield to the
fact. 1°6 Support is given to this position by the assertion of the Court in
Safe Deposit and Trust Co. of Baltimore v. Virginia °7 to the effect that intangible property may acquire a taxable situs where permanently located,
employed, and protected""s the same as tangible property, and that the same
reasons which led the Court in the Union Transit and Frick cases to deny
application of the fiction mobilia sequuntur personam to tangibles should
likewise be applied to intangibles in order to avoid double and oppressive
taxation, pointing out that "the fiction mobilia sequuntur personlam was intended for convenience and not to be controlling where justice does not demand it."
As tested by the ship. cases the fiction mobilia sequuntur personant is
applied to tangibles where so to do will not result in injustice due to double
taxation, but when the tangible becomes taxable in another state the fiction
gives way.' °5 Likewise the fiction applies generally to intangibles but when
some other jurisdiction acquires a better basis on which to tax it should give
way to avoid the injustice of double taxation. As suggested by Mr. Powell,
"the reasons of policy which require the exemption of chattels from taxation
at the domicile of the owner, when they are taxable where they are, would
seem at first glance to apply to the exemption of debts under similar circumstances."1 10 Clearly as between the two jurisdictions, if only one is to be permitted to tax, the state of the business situs has the better basis. There the
business is being carried on on behalf of the owner, there the credit is localized and employed incident to such business, there privileges are enjoyed

applied in order to determine the situs of intangible personal property for taxation (citing
Blodgett v. Silberman), but the general rule
must yield to the established fact of legal ownership, actual presence and control elsewhere, and
ought not be applied if so to do would result
in inescapable and patent injustice whether
through double taxation or otherwise." (citing
as two of four cases State Board of Assessors
v. Comptoir National d'Escompte and Liverpool
& London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Board of Assessors of Parish of Orleans, both supra note 10,
both of which are business situs cases).
Safe
Deposit and Trust Co. of Baltimore v. Virginia,
supra note 15, at 92.
106. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co.

v. Board of Assessors of Parish of Orleans, supra
note 10, at 354.
107. Supra note 15, at 93.
108. Citing New Orleans v. Stcmpel, Bristol
v. Washington County, State Board of Assessors
v. Comptoir National d'Escompte, Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. New Orleans, and Liverpool &
London , Globe Ins. Co. v. Orleans Assessors,
all supra note 10, all of which are business situs
cases.
109. Southern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, supra
note 101, at 68. See also supra note 78.
110. Powell, op. cit. supra note, 78, at 304,
citing Mr. Chief Justice White's dissent without
opinion in Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v.
Louisville, supra note 12.
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and protection afforded. These should prevail over the mere application
of a fiction at the owner's domicile.
The position taken in this regard, it is submitted, is not inconsistent
with the earlier assertion made in connection with the discussion of the
claim of the debtor's domicile to tax, that in such a case there is no res upon
which to levy the tax, that the thing of value has no actual situs of its own
and that the tax is in its nature a personal one. Such is its nature in the
ordinary situation, but when the creditor so deals with his credits as to
localize them in another jurisdiction as incident to a business there being
conducted on his behalf, to make them a part of that business in the same
fashion as if he were there conducting a business himself, the ordinary situation breaks down and the claim to tax by the creditor's domicile should
give way to that of the situs created by the course of dealing. The fact
of the owner's domicile being denied the right to tax in such a case would
not constitute a very serious interference with its source of revenue, particularly if it may be permitted to levy an income tax upon the profits of such
a business conducted on behalf of its residents."'
While the Court has repeatedly asserted in the past that taxation at the
business situs does not preclude taxation at the owner's domicile," 2 the
present attitude of the Court would clearly seem to demand that one or the
other must give way. Numerous state cases may be found evidencing a disposition to allow business situs to prevail. 1 3 While it is true these cases
largely represent matters of statutory construction, they are based on the
same tests of fairness and policy that lie at the basis of the recent holdings
of the Supreme Court and which must ultimately guide that Court in the
determination of this issue.
There would seem to be no serious objection to the result herein advocated. The power of the state of the owner's domicile to tax would not
be dependent upon the exercise of that power by the state of busincss
situs but upon the existence of such power. If the intangible has acquired
a business situs in another state, that of itself, should put an end to the
power of the state of the domicile to tax." 4

111. State v. Gulf, M. & N. R. Co., 138 Miss.
70, 104 S. 689 (1925) and Crescent Manufacturing Co. v. Tax Commission, 129 S.C. 480, 124
S.E. 76 (1924) would apparently permit such a
tax. Cf. Maguire v. Trefry, 253 U.S. 12, 40
S.Ct. 417, 64 L.Ed. 739 (1920); Cook v. Tait,
265 U.S. 47, 44 S.Ct. 444, 68 LEd. 895 (1923);
Longyear v. Commissioner of Corporations and
Taxation, 265 Mass. 585, 164 N.E. 459 (1928);
State ex rel. Manitowoc Gas Co. v. Wisconsin
State Tax Commission, 161 Wis. 111, 152 N.W.
848 (1915). See Powell, Due Process Tests of

State Taxation 1922.1925, (1926) 74 U. OF PA.
L.REV. 423, 438; Maguire, Relief From Double
Taxation of Personal Incomes (1923) 32 YALE
L.J. 757; Note (1931) 71 A.L.R. 685. See also
infra note 121. But cf.In re Opinion of the
Justices, 149 Atl. 321 (N.H.) 1930.
112. Supra note 88; 2 COOLEY, op. cit.
supra note 4, at 467.
113. Supra note 11.
114. Commonwealth v. West India Oil Refining Co., and Commonwealth v. Ir.F. Avery
and Sons, both supra note 11.
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CREAM OF WHEAT AND ADAMS EXPRESS CASES
Somewhat closely associated with the problems of business situs are
those arising out of the application of the doctrines set forth in such cases
as Cream of Wheat Co. v. County of Grand Forks"5 and Adams Express Co.
v. Ohio State Auditor."' The former permits the state of incorporation to
tax the whole of the intangible value of the property interests of a domestic
corporation though the corporation owns no property and does no business
within the territorial limits of the state. By the doctrine of the latter case
each state in which tangible property is used and business done may assess
its proportionate share of the intangible value attributable to the property
and business of a foreign corporation doing a connected business in more
than one state. In such a case the market value of its stock may be vastly
greater than that of its tangible property, and that excess of intangible value
is to be apportioned by each state to the property used therein, business done
therein, etc., as deriving its value from such property and business carried on
in and protected by such state, and may be taxed accordingly. The intangible
value arises not alone from the incorporation of the company in its state
of domicile, but has been created by the conduct of the business as a going
concern and becomes incident to the tangible property and business done in
each state. Each state is permitted to tax that intangible increment of value
it has helped to create.
Let us combine the doctrines of these two cases and observe the result
by way of facilitating the taxation of the same property interest in two
states at the same time. By the doctrine of the former case all of the intangible property value is taxed in the state of the corporation's domicile,
even though none of its tangible property is located there and none of its
business is done there. At the same time, by the doctrine of the latter case,
115. Supra note 12. A statute of North
Dakota provided that all domestic corporations
should be taxed upon all real and personal property within the state on the same basis as an
individual, and in addition that there be assessed against it an amount equal to the aggregate market value of its outstanding stock,
less the value of its real and personal property.
The Cream of Wheat Company was incorporated
in North Dakota and maintained an office within the state but all of its manufacturing, commercial, and financial business was conducted
wholly outside the state, and it bad not at any
tim within the state any real or tangible personal property or any papers by which intangible
property was evidenced, such as notes, etc. The
tax upon the intangible property of the Cream
of Wheat Company was upheld though all of its
property had been taxed in other states.

116. Supra note 87. An Ohio statute provided for the taxing of express companies on their
entire property, tangible and intangible, within
the state, the valuation being based on the proportion of the whole capital stock of the company assignabe to the state on a consideration
of the real and personal property, gross receipts
and mileage within and without the state. It
appeared that the company had some $4,000,000
of tangible property, real and personal, some
$67,000 of which was within Ohio, and that the
market value of its outstanding stock was in
excess of $16,000,000, thus making an intangible
value of some $12,000,000. The company contended that Ohio should be permitted to, tax
only to the extent of the $67,000 tangible property within the state. A tax upon an additional
proportion of the $12,000,000 intangible value
was sustained.
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all of the intangible property value is taxed again in the states in which the
tangible property of the corporation is located and its business done. Recognizing the possibilities of this situation, the Court in the Cream of Wheat
case expressed satisfaction with the result and asserted that the limitation
upon the power to tax a resident on his property having a permanent situs
outside the state "has no application to intangible property even though the
property is also taxable in another state by virtue of having acquired a business situs there. '117 For this proposition the Court cited Fidelity & Columbia. Trust Co. v. Louisville,118 for which it is not necessarily an authority,
though it is frequently so cited. All that was decided in that case was that
a depositor in a bank in St. Louis who was a resident of Louisville could be
taxed on his deposit at his domicile. The Court conceded, in what amounted to pure dictum, that the deposit could have been taxed by Missouri under
former decisions, citing business situs cases. 1 " This, however, was not at
all necessary to a decision and there was at least room for serious doubt as
to whether any business situs existed in Missouri.120 It does indicate, however, that the Court as then constituted would have permitted a second tax
at the domicile though already taxed at the business situs.
It now becomes pertinent to inquire whether or not the doctrine of the
Union Transit case against taxing property at the domicile which has acquired a situs in another jurisdiction should not be extended to apply to
this situation. There would seem to, be no greater obstacles to reaching
this result than existed in the Farmers Loan and Trust and Baldwin cases.
The result, by allowing the doctrine of the Adams Express Co. case to take
precedence over that of the Cream of Wheat case, would be just one more
step in the direction of eliminating the evils of multiple state taxation, which
the Court seems to have set out to accomplish. The reasons for the choice
here expressed are substantially the same as those involved in the business
situs cases. Whether one chooses to label this a case of business situs or not,
the intangible increment of value does appear to bear a very definite relation to the tangible property and the business done, to derive its value therefrom, and to be protected by the state wherein the tangible property is located and the business is carried on. The claim of such a state to the right

118. Supra note 12. One Ewald resided in
Louisville but continued to conduct through an
agent a business in St. Louis where he had forromthebusiness
one coing
lied.
merl Money
mery lived.
coming from
the
sn
had been deposited in St. Louis banks subject
to Ewald's order alone. It was not used further
in connection with the business. Such deposits
were held taxable in Louisville.

politan Life Ins. Co. v. New Orleans, both supra
note 10.
20. The deposits bad no further connection
w
with the business in St. Louis, were subject solely' to the order of Ewald, the owner, subject to
his personal check, and would seem to be the
same as any other deposit account. The fact
The origfact
aont.
same
the soanyothr
source from dpit
which the
money was
that
inally derived was the local business would not
seem to give them a business situs, since they

119. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co.
v. Board of Assessors of Orleans, and Metro-

were not used further in the business and had
no other connection therewith.

117.

Supra note 12, at 329.
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to tax would seem to be a much more real one than that of the domiciliary
state by a mere application of the fiction mobilia sequuntur personam. Ordinarily the corporation, unlike the Cream of Wheat Company, will have
part of its property and business within the state of its domicile. The
principles involved as to the taxation of intangible value, however, would
be the same. Giving precedence to the doctrine of the Adams Express Co.
case would still leave the state of the corporation's domicile free to levy
a franchise tax, an income"' or receipts tax in so far as it may not constitute
a burden upon interstate commerce, 2 - and of course a property tax both
with respect to tangibles and intangibles on the same basis as other states
where any property is located or business done within its territorial limits.
It may be suggested that perhaps not all states employ business situs
as a basis for taxation or that not all will tax the intangible value as in the
Adams Express Co. case, and that where the state other than the domicile
does not so tax, the latter should be left free to do so. It may further be
suggested that the jurisdiction or Lonstitutional power of the domiciliary
state to tax should not be made to depend upon the accident of whether or
not the other state has taxed. Clearly the fact of the other state having
taxed or failed to tax can in no way affect the constitutional power of the
domiciliary state to tax, but it is submitted that if the intangible has actually acquired a situs for taxation in another state, as it has in the business situs
cases or in the Adams Express Co. case, that should negative the existence of
a right on the part of the domiciliary state to tax. Whether or not it has
actually been taxed in the other state is a matter of no importance, just as
in the case of tangible property. If a ship, which is admittedly taxable at
the owner's domicile until it acquires a situs elsewhere, though never within
the domiciliary state, actually acquires a situs in another state the power
121.
It may be observed at this point that as
to income taxes, either individual or corporate,
state statutes quite commonly limit the tax at

the domicile to such income as is derived from
sources within the state, particularly if such income from other sources is subjected to a tax
in the state wherein it arises. Whether the due
process clause may be construed to constitute any
limitation upon the power of the domiciliary state
to tax income arising outside its boundaries, or
whether income taxes may come to be treated as
purely personal taxes and leviable only by such
state (though Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37,
40 S.Ct. 221, 64 L.Ed. 445, 1920, allowed such
a tax by the non-domiciliary state as to income
arising therein) are questions that remain for
future determination. No doubt the same reasons which are directing the Court to restrict
the taxation of property, both tangible and intangible, to a single jurisdiction may well be

expected to lead to a similar result with respect
to income taxes. It is not, however, within
the proper province of the present article to
enter upon a consideration of that problem. For
a discussion of this matter see Rottschaefer,
State Jurisdiction of Income for Tax Purposes
(1931) 44 HARV.L.REV. 1075.
See also supra
note 111.
122. United States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak
Creek, 247 U.S. 321, 38 S.Ct. 449, 62 L.Ed. 1135
(1918).
See 2 COOLEY, op. cit. supra note 4,
at 892, 893, 894.
123. For a case so holding with respect to
business situs, and further holding that a tax
by the domicile under such circumstances would
be unconstitutional even though the jurisdiction
of the situs may have failed to tax, see Commonwealth v. West India Oil Refining Co., supra
note 11.
See Note (1912)
36 L.I..A. (N.S.)
295.
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of the owner's domicile to tax comes to an end and the fact that the state of
situs may have neglected to tax would seem to be immaterial. The matter
of intangible property having a situs at the domicile of the owner is only
fiction at best, and when it occupies such a relation to tangible property or
to business done in another jurisdiction as to give it a situs there for taxayield to the fact and the latter state alone should be
tion, the fiction should
2

permitted to tax.1

As stated above, a careful study of the cases appears to reveal that one
of the principal factors, if not the deciding influence, in causing the Court to
arrive at the conclusion, in cases like the Union Transit case, that tangible
property having acquired a permanent situs, in another jurisdiction is no
longer taxable at the domicile of the owner, was the aversion to this form
of what is commonly called double taxation.121 If that be true, as it certainly is, and if it be further true, as it also undoubtedly is, that the same sort
of aversion now exists to taxing intangible property twice under similar
circumstances, there would seem to be no good reason why the Court should

not apply the same doctrine to intangible property and no longer allow the
state of the domicile to tax when it has actually acquired a situs for purposes of taxation in another jurisdiction.
MORTGAGE INTEREST IN REALTY
In Baldwin v. Missouri the notes involved, with respect to which Missouri sought to collect an inheritance tax, were secured by mortgages upon
Missouri real estate. In denying the validity of the tax the Court announced no new doctrine but adhered to the well established rule of considering the credit, in the absence of a statute otherwise specially providing,
as the thing taxable and not its security. The holding does not, however,
weaken the force of cases like Savings and Loan Society' v. Multnomah
Count3p1

25

which allow the state in which the land is located to tax to the

non-resident mortgagee, not the credit, but his interest in the realty by which
the obligation is secured. In the Baldwin case no attempt was made to tax
the mortgagee's interest in the realty as was done by express statutory provision in the Multnomah County case, but only to tax the credits represented
by the notes. The majority opinion in the Baldwin case asserts, "This
cause does not involve the right of a state to tax either the interest which the
mortgagee as such may have in lands lying therein [in Missouri], or the
124. Supra notes 78 and 79.
125. Supra note 12. Residents of Multnomah
County, Oregon, made notes payable to the
Savings & Loan Society, a California corporation, secured by mrtgages on local land. The
mortgages and notes were kept in California. A
statute of Oregon provided that such mortgages

together with the debts, for purposes of assessment and taxation, should be treated as land or
real property. No tax was provided for against
the notes or credits as such. A tax against the
non-resident mortgagee corporation on its interest in the realty mortgaged was sustained.
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Thus it would appear that the Court meant

to leave the question entirely unaffected by that decision. The question must
arise, however, as to whether such a tax, at the same time that the credit is
taxed like any other intangible at the creditor's domicile, is inconsistent with
the principles set forth by the Court, and if so, which tax has the better
claim to be continued.
In a situation such as that involved in the Baldwin case with notes
given by Missouri debtors, secured by mortgages upon Missouri realty, but
owned by a creditor domiciled in Illinois, if Missouri had a statute such as
that of Oregon in the Multnomah County case, the tax levied by Missouri
would not be upon the credit, over which the Court in the Baldwin case
determined it had not the requisite jurisdiction to tax, but upon the mortgage
interest in the realty over which it clearly does have jurisdiction. This is
unlike the business situs cases where, by virtue of acquiring such a business
situs on the basis of which it may be taxed by a state other than that of the
owner's domicile, the latter state is thought to lose its right to tax. Here
are involved two distinct property interests. One, the credit within the
jurisdiction and subject to the taxing power of Illinois by virtue of its being
the domicile of the owner; the other the mortgage interest in the realty within the jurisdiction and subject to the taxing power of Missouri as any other
interest in land within the state. Each state may be permitted to tax accordingly. It is to be observed, of course, that in the absence of a special
statute such as that involved in the Multnomah County case, states quite uniformly disregard the mortgage interest in the realty and treat the property
interest merely as a credit taxable only at the domicile of the creditor.127
Perhaps it would be desirable, at least from the standpoint of avoiding
multiple state taxation of substantially the same economic interest, that no
such special statutes should be enacted. Yet no reasonable basis suggests
itself upon which such statutes, if enacted, can be held invalid. From the
standpoint of the creditor's domicile, the same principles that prevailed in
the Farmers Loan and Trust and Baldwin cases would seem to sustain the
tax. The principal thing is the debt, the security is merely incidental, and
as the great weight of authority in the past has indicated, it would seem that
the state of the owner's domicile may apply the same principles as apply
to the ordinary case of intangibles and collect the tax. From the standpoint of the state where. the land is located, the logic of the other position
seems equally clear. In the case where both the debtor and the creditor
are residents clearly no objection can be offered. By special statute no tax
126. Supra note 17, at 594.
127. For a discussion of the state of the law
on this subject as it has heretofore existed, with
a citation of authorities, see Chambers, State

Inheritance Tax on Foreign Held Bonds or Notes
Secured by a Mortgage on Land in the State
(1927) 12 CORN. L.Q. 172, 180 ff,; Note (1926)
42 A.L.R.

354, 360.
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is levied on the credits as such. Nothing is taxed but the mortgaged realty
and that not to a single owner. The tax is levied both on the mortgagor
and the mortgagee in accordance with their respective interests in the realty.
As asserted by the Court in the Multnomah County case, "the state may
tax real estate mortgaged, as it may all other property within its jurisdiction,
at its full value. It may do this, either by taxing the whole to the mortgagor,
or by taxing to the mortgagee the interest therein represented by the mortgage, and to the mortgagor the remaining interest in the land ....,128 Such
a system is without doubt fairer than that which prevails in many states of
taxing the whole of the value of the realty to the mortgagor regardless of
how small his equity may be, and at the same time taxing the mortgagee
upon the credit. It would not seem that such a method of taxation could
be held to be beyond the power of the state to apply. Perhaps it may be
suggested 'that where such a system is applied something akin to business
situs exists and on that basis that the debt should be considered as merged
in the security and that this should preclude the possibility of a tax on the
credit at the domTcile of the mortgagee in the interest of eliminating the
evils of double taxation. This, however, unlike the case of business situs,
would have the objectionable feature of making the existence of the power
to tax on the part of the domiciliary state depend entirely upon, not the existence of a power in another state to tax as in the business situs cases, but the
mere chance of whether or not the state in, which the land lies has chosen
to exercise its power to tax, not the credit, which the state of domicile alone
can tax, but the distinct and separate interest of the mortgagee in the realty,
which clearly is not subject to tax in the other jurisdiction. The only other
solution consistent with this theory of the existence of a power to tax on the
part of the state where the land is located would seem to be to overthrow
completely the commonly accepted conception and treat the situs of the security as the sole place for taxation in all cases. This would hardly appear to be either desirable or justifiable.
While permitting both states to tax may result in the undesirable subjection of substantially the same economic interest to a tax in two jurisdictions, nevertheless there do exist two distinct and separate property interests which are being taxed, which may serve to distinguish 'this from other
situations dealt with herein. The credit seems properly taxable as other intangibles, whether secured or unsecured, at the domicile of the owner; the
mortgage interest in the realty, like any other interest in realty,
at the situs
of the land.
It is quite possible, however, that the logic of the situation may not be
permitted to control and that the Court ultimately may feel compelled as a
matter of policy to restrict such taxation to a single jurisdiction. If such
128.

Supra note 12, at 427.
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should be the case, since the domicile of the creditor is being permitted to
prevail in other situations, it would not be greatly surprising to see the
Court reach the same result here. As comparatively few states provide a
tax upon the mortgagee's interest as realty this would not, as a practical matter, constitute any serious interference with the taxing systems of most
states. Also since the state may tax the whole value of the land to the mortgagor, at least under present decisions, no restriction upon the state's source
of revenue would result. 2 ' If this result is to be reached it would seem that
the Court must frankly admit that it is dictated by considerations of expediency and the desire to avoid the evils of multiple state taxation. To
say that the due process clause requires such a holding certainly would be going much further toward reducing that constitutional provision completely
to a criterion for measuring policy and desirability than the Court has heretofore been disposed to go.
It is to be noted, of course, that the due process clause is the only reliance
available, and such a holding as herein suggested as a possibility would place
a new construction upon that provision. It can hardly be contended that
either state is so far lacking in jurisdiction, as that term has been understood in the past, as to make its tax a violation of due process. Instead this
is a situation in which the same economic interest bears such a relation to two
states that each seems to have a valid claim to tax. To reach the result here
mentioned it would seem that either, as hereinbefore suggested, it must be
held that a tax by two states upon the same economic interest to the samt:
owner at the same time is so far arbitrary as to be a denial of due process
and leave the Court only the task of determining which has the better claim,
or the position must be frankly taken that the due process clause authorizes
the Court to become the final arbiter of questions of policy. Perhaps the
Court is not willing to go this far. 30°
SHARES OF CORPORATE STOCK
There has been much speculation since the determination of the Farmcrs Loan and Trust and Baldwin cases as to the effect of the present doctrine of the Supreme Court upon the taxation of shares of corporate stock,
129. This would still leave the way open for
a tax by two states on substantially the same
economic interest, though to different owners,
the land being taxed to the mortgagor by one
state and the credit to the mortgagee by another,
or both by the same state for that matter; but
that problem, like other similar siiuations such
as a tax on the property of a corporation while
at the same time the shares are taxed to the
shareholders, is one beyond the scope of the
present article,
130. The languige of the Court, speaking

through Mr. Justice Roberts, in the very recent
Indiana Chain Store Tax Case (State Board of
Tax Commissioners of Indiana v. Jackson ........
U.S ......... 51 S.Ct. 540, 543, 75 L.Ed. 670 (1931)
to the effect that, "It is not the function of this
Court in cases like the present to consider the
propriety or justness of the tax, to seek for
motives, or to criticize the public policy which
prompted the adoption of the legislation," possibly may be thought to indicate a swing of
the pendulum away from the practice of giving
consideration to matters of policy.
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particularly where the owner is domiciled in a state other than that of incorporation. It seems entirely correct to assert that shares of stock are intangibles, primarily of the nature of choses, do not represent ownership of
the actual property of a corporation, but merely a right to share in the corporate profits and in the assests upon final dissolution. There can be no two
distinct property interests involved as is conceivable in the mortgage situation just considered. If due process requires the abandonment of multiple
state taxation of other intangibles, it would seem to require as much with
respect to corporate stock.
No little difficulty is encountered, however, in determining which state
should be permitted to tax. Heretofore some support has been given to
at least four possibilities, all of which might conceivably tax at the same
time, and according to the earlier cases violate no provision of the federal
Constitution.al These possibilities are:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

The state
The state
The state
The state

in which the certificates of stock are kept.
in which the transfer books are kept.
of incorporation.
of the owner's domicile.

(a) The bases for the contention that the state in which the certificates of stock are kept should be permitted to tax are substantially the same
as those by means of which it was sought to attribute tangible character
to other paper evidences, such as notes and bonds, and tax them where
found. 132 Always of doubtful soundness, and certainly of questionable desirability, there would seem to be no longer any possible basis for such a tax
since the decision in Baldwin v. Missouri, having the effect, as it apparently
-does, of entirely overruling Wheeler v. Sohmer as to taxing other intangibles
on the basis of the presence of the paper evidence.
(b) As to the state wherein the transfer books are kept, it is submitted that little sound basis has ever existed for sustaining the tax, though
some support can be found in the cases 33 and legal literature.13 4 In so far
as a property tax is concerned, there can be little basis for the claim. Clearly thie property interest is not within the state or subject to its control. in
131.
For a collection of cases see Note (1926)
43 A.L.R. 686, 698.
132. For a discussion of this point and eltation of cases see Note (1919) 7 CALIF. L.REV.
117.

ham v. City Trust Co. of New York, 115 App.
Div. 584, 101 N.Y.S. 87 (1906), affirmed in
193 N.Y. 642, 86 N.E. 1131 (1908).
134. Peppin, The Power of States to Tax
Intangibles or Their Transfer (1930) 18 CALIF.

133. See Attorney General v. Higgins, 2 H.
& N. 339 (1857); Brassard v. Smith, 1925 A.C.

L.REV. 638, 670; Note (1925) 38 HARV.L.REV.
804, 815. Contra: Kroeger, Constitutional Limi-

371;

Erie

Beach

Company

Ltd.

v.

Attorney

General for Ontario, 1930 A.C.. 161. Cf. Lockwood v. United States Steel Corporation, 209
N.Y. 375, 103 N.E. 697 (1913). Contra: Dun-

tations of

State Jurisdiction over Property for

Succession Tax Purposes (1929) 14 ST. LOUIS
L.REV. 99, 133.
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so far as any distinction may be thought to exist between the basis for a
property tax and a transfer tax, it may be urged that the latter tax should be
permitted. In order to complete the transfer a transfer must be had on the
books of the corporation which are within the jurisdiction. But the ultimate control of the matter of transfer would seem to be more nearly with
the corporation at its domicile than with the agent in charge of the transfer
books. There would seem to be little difference, for purposes of applying
the transfer tax, between the transfer of shares of stock on the books of a
corporation and the transfer of registered bonds. 1 5 As to the latter, the
Court has expressly denied the power to levy a transfer tax except by the
domicile of the owner. 1 36 It is to be further noted that under the Uniform
Stock Transfer Act shares of stock are made transferable by the mere
transfer of the certificate.137 Where that is in effect the corporate books
would seem to serve little more than record purposes"" and all claims for a
right to tax in such a state would appear to be entirely without foundation."'
As in the case of (a) above with respect to taxing where the certificate is
kept, this basis for taxation has never been widely accepted, has always
been subjected to severe criticism, and its complete passing would certainly
not be deeply lamented.
(c)
The state of incorporation makes a much stronger bid for approval of its right to tax though the stock be owned by a non-resident. The
tendency in the past has been to give very wide recognition to the doctrine
that it may be permitted to tax. 4 ° Two factors especially suggest themselves in this connection, one or both of which are usually relied upon by
135.

The Supreme

Judicial Court of Mas-

sachusetts in Bliss v. Bliss, 221 Mass. 201, 205
ff., 109 N.E. 148, L.R.A. 1916A, 889 (1915),
allowed such a tax, and though the bonds involved were bonds of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts and the doctrine of Blackstone
v. Miller might have been applied, the Court
relied strongly upon the place of registry being
within the state. Contra: Tax Commission v.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 119 Ohio St. 410,
See Carpenter, Jurisdic164 N.E. 423 (1929).
tion Over Debts for the Purpose of Administra31
tion, Garnishment, and Taxation (1918)
HARV.L.REV. 905, 928; Note (1925) 38 HARV.
See also Benwell et al.
L.REV. 809, 815 n. 41.
v. City of Newark, 10 Dick. Ch., 55 N.J. Eq.
260, 36 At. 668 (1897).
136. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota, supra note 16. At p. 208 the court asserts, "Registration of certain of the bonds we
regard as an immaterial circumstance."
137. Section 1, Uniform Stock Transfer Act.
138. Besides providing that title to a certificate of stock may be transferred by delivery
properly indorsed or by a separate written assign-

ment, Section 1 of the Act further provides that
"The provisions of this section shall be applicable
although the charter or articles of incorporation
or code of regulations or by-lawg of the corporation and the certificate itself, provide that
the shares represented thereby shall be transferred only on the books of the corporation or
shall be registered by a registrar or transferred
by a transfer agent."
139. Note (1925) 38 HARV.L.REV. 809, 815.
140. "That it was rightly determined (by
the lower court) that it was within the power
of the state to fix, for the purpose of taxation, the
situs of stock in a domestic corporation, whether
held by residents or non-residents, is so conclusively settled by the prior adjudications of
this court that the subject is not open for disCorry v. Baltimore, supra note 23, at
cussion."
474; Hawley v. Malden, supra note 12, at 10, 12.
See collection of cases in Note (1926) 42 A.L.R.
354, 365; Note L.R.A. 1915C, 903, 944; Peppin,
op. cit. supra note 134, at 663. But see North
Co. v. Commissioners of
Carolina Railroad
Alamance, 91 N.C. 454 (1884).
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the courts as sufficient bases for sustaining either a property tax 1 41 or a
transfer tax.' 42 The first is the fact that the state of the corporation's domicile, by creating the corporation, has the power to control it and the relation
which shall exist between it and its shareholders, or prescribe the conditions
and regulations under which persons may become members 43 of or shareholders in such a corporation.14 The second is the suggestion contained
in many cases that the shareholder acquires an interest in or ownership of
the property 45 and business of the corporation, that the business is conducted by the corporation on his behalf, and that the state which controls
the corporation and its property and business should be permitted to tax
the shareholder upon his interest therein.' 4 '
As to the first of these suggestions, the mere fact of creating and controlling the corporation and setting forth the regulations controlling its issuance of stock would not seem to constitute any very compelling argument
for sustaining such a tax. The mere fact that the state exercises the power of control suggested does not necessarily mean that the intangible prop141.
Corry v. Baltimore, supra note 23; Hawley v. Malden, supra note 12; Town of St. Albans v. National Car Co., 57 Vt. 68 (1884).
142. In re Culver's Estate (Morrow v. Gould)
145 Iowa 1, 123 N.W. 743 (1909); Greeves v.
Shaw, 173 Mass. 205, 53 N.E. 372 (1899); Kingsbury v. Chapin, 196 Mass. 533, 82 N.E. 700
(1907); State ex rel. Graff v. Probate Court of
St. Louis County, 128 Minn. 371, 150 N.W.
1094 (1915); Gardiner et at v. Carter, 74 N.H.
507, 69 At. 939 (1908); Dixon v. Russell, 79
N.J.L. 490, 76 Atl. 982 (1910); Matter of Bronson, 150 N.Y. 1, 44 N.E. 707 (1896); Matter
of Fitch, 160 N.Y. 87, 54 N.E. 701 (1899). See
Baker v. Baker, Eccles and Company, 242 U.S.
394, 401, 37 S.Ct. 152, 61 L.Ed. 386 (1916).
143.
"The corporation is the creature of state
laws and those who becone 'its members, as
shareholders, are subject to the operation of those
laws, with respect to any limitations upon their
property rights and with respect to the right
to assess their property interests for taxation."
Matter of Bronson, supra note 142, at 9, 10.
"The true nature of a share of stock in a
corporation is its conferring of membership in
the corporption itself. The stock is a creature
of the law that created the corporation, and its
ownership depends solely upon the provisions
of that law. The right of the owner of the
stock is therefore, although intangible, a right
especially created and guarded by the law of ore
state, is always within the power of that law, and
must be regarded as within its taxing power.
Beale, op. cit. supra note 6, at 602.
144. Corry v. Baltimore, supra note 23; Hawley v. Malden, supra note 12; State v. Travelers'

Ins. Co., 70 Conn. 590, 4 Atl. 465 (1898);
American Coal Co. v. County Commissioners
of Allegahy County, 59 Md. 185 (1882); Town
of St. Albans v. National Car Co., supra note 141.
145.
"If shares of stock represented nothing
but that which is intangible, it could with better
reason be claimed that they must always follow
the domicile of the owner and cannot be taxed
elsewhere, but they represent the property of
the corporation in which the capital stock is invested. The owner of the stock is not merely the
owner of a right to dividcnds, but he is owner
of a proportionate share of the property of the
corporation. (Italics the writer's) Town of St.
Albans v. National Car Co., supra note 141, at
98; State v. Travelers' Ins. Co., supra note 144;
Faxton v. MeCosh, 12 Iowa 527 (1861); In re
Culver's Estate (Morrow v. Gould) supra note
142; American Coal Co. v. County Commissioners
of Allegany County, supra note 144; Matter of
B'ronson and Matter of Fitch, both supra note
142.
146. Greeves v. Shaw and Matter of fironson, both supra note 142. Perhaps more cases
than otherwise merely assume the power to so
tax without undertaking to explain the basis
thereof. Whitney v. Ragsdale, 33 Ind. 107
(1870) ; Baltimore v. Baltimore City Passenger
Ry. Co., 57 Md. 31 (1881); South Nashville
Street By. Co. v. Morrow, 87 Tenn, 406, 11 S.W.
348
(1889) ; Abingdon Bank v. Washington
County, 88 Va. 293, 13 S.E. 407 (1891); Union
Bank v. Richmond, 94 Va. 316, 26 S.E. 821
(1897).
See also Peppin, op. cit. supra note 134,
at 663 and cases there cited.
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erty right belonging to a non-resident shareholder is within that state's
jurisdiction so as to justify a tax. The position of the state in this respect is
little different from that which it occupies with relation to its municipal corporations. It creates them, it' controls completely their organization and
functioning, and it sets forth the conditions, restrictions, and regulations
under which such municipal corporations may issue bonds, and in much the
same sense that it controls the relation of a shareholder to a domestic corporation it controls the relation of the bondholder to the municipality. 147 If
we add to this situation, particularly in connection with the application of a
transfer or inheritance tax, the further fact that the bonds, be they municipal
or state, are registered, and for their transfer there must be a transfer on
the books of registry by the proper officer, it would seem that quite as strong
a case exists for taxation in the case of the bonds as in the case of' the
stock.1 48 Yet it is not to be contended since the Farmers Loan and Trust
case that such a state may tax the bonds of a non-resident owner or their
transfer. It is true that the relation of a shareholder to his corporation is
essentially different from that of the bondholder to the municipal corporation issuing the bond, 149 but that does not alter the analogy in so far as reliance for the power to tax is placed alone upon the state's creation and
control over the corporation A.nd its power to issue stock as involved in this
first basis, and in so far as the relationship is different it has a bearing on
the power to tax only as involved in the second basis asserted.
It is sometimes further suggested in this connection that in order for
the shareholder to sustain a claim against the corporation arising out of
his ownership of stock, resort must be had to the laws and the courts of the
state of the corporate domicile. This argument is not more compelling, however, than in the case of a creditor resorting, to the courts of the debtor's
state or those of the state in which the landed security is, located, neither
of which is permitted to control.5 0 Furthermore, the compulsion to resort
to the courts of the state of incorporation is much less than in the case of
the state or municipal bondholder who can never by any chance have his
15
action in another jurisdiction. 1
As to the second basis, it is submitted that the emphasis upon the ownership of or interest in the property of the corporation is unsound since it is
well established that the shareholder does not own the property of the cor-poration but only has a right in the nature of a chose to participate in the
147. Bliss v. Bliss, sunra note 135; cf. Herbert v. Simson, 220 Mass. 480, 1.08 N.E. 65
(1915).
148. Ibid. 206, 207.
149. For a comment upon the diminishing
differences between the bondholder and the
stockholder in relation to the corporation see'
Comment, Dotblc Inheritance Taxation of In-

tangibles (1930), 40 YALE L.J. 99, 104.
150. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota,
supra note 16; Baldwin v. Missouri, supra note
17.
151.
Bliss v. Bliss, supra note 135, at 206;
Dissent of Mr. justice Holmes in Farmers' Loan
& Trust Co. v. Minnesota, supra note 16, at 218.
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surplus earnings, if any, and upon final dissolution, in the assets of the
corporation. This position is strengthened by the holding of the Court in
Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Doughton152 denying any right to North
Carolina to tax the. transfer of shares of stock of a non-resident decedent
in a foreign corporation having two-thirds of its property in the state. The
Court emphatically repudiated the contention that the shareholder had any
such interest in the property of the corporation as would give that state
jurisdiction over the shares of stock merely by virtue of having the corporate
property within its territorial limits.153

The holding would clearly have

been the same had all the property and all the business of the corporation
been within the state. Conversely, no exception has been made in the cases
upholding the tax at the domicile of the corporation on the ground that the
property and business of the corporation are not within the state,15 4 unless
such may be said of cases like Matter of Cooley"; where the corporation
is incorporated in more than one state and the valuation of the shares for
purposes of taxation is prorated among the states of incorporation in proportion to corporate property and business in the respective states. This
position is taken, however, not because the property is outside the state,
or that its absence from the state would affect the state's power, but be152. 270 U.S. 69. 46 S.Ct. 256, 70 L.Ed. 475,
48 A.L.R. 1374 (1926).
Cf. National Savings
& Loan Ass'n v. Gillis, 35 F. (2d) 386 (S.D.
Idaho
1928) ;
Oregon
Mortgage
Company,
Limited, v. Gillis, 40 F (2d) 744 (S.D. Idaho
1930).
153. See cases cited infra note 174.
154. State v. Gloster Lumber Co., 147 Ark.
461, 227 S.W. 770 (1921).
See Welch et al. v.
Treasurer and Receiver General, 223 Mass. 87,
111 N.E. 774 (1916).
Many cases exist in which
a substantial part of the corporate property is
outsile the state and that is held to make no
difference and require no reduction in the valuation of the shares. State v. Bodcaw Lumber
Co., 128 Ark. 505, 194 S.W. 692 (1917); First
National Bank of Junction Cily v. Moon, 102
Kan. 334, 170 P. 33, L.R.A. 1918 C 986 (1918);
First Nftional Bank of Veiser v. Washington
County, 17 Idaho 306. 105 P. 1053 (1909); Amerlean Coal Co. v. County Commissioners of Allegany County, supra note 144; Commercial National Bank v. Chambers, 21 Utah 324, 61 P. 560,
50 L.R.A. 346 (1900).
See 3 COOLEY, op. ct.
supra note 4, at 989. The same holding has been
followed where part or all of the capital of the
corporation is invested in property exempt from
state taxation. Cleveland Trust Co. v. Lauder,
184 U.S. 111, 22 S.Ct. 394, 46 L.Ed. 456 (1902);
Roberts v. Automobile Ins. Co. of Hartford.
89 Conn. 181, 93 Atl. 243 (1915): Daniel v.
Bank of Clayton County, 154 Ga. 282, 114 S.E.
210 (1922); Des Moines National Bank v. Fair-

weather, 191 Iowa 1240, 181 N.W. 459 (1921);
Peters Trust Co. v. Douglas County, 106 Nebr.
877, 184 N.W. 8i2 (1921); Mechanics' National
Bank of Trenton v, Baker, 65 N.J.L. 113, 46
Atl. 586 (1900); Pullen v. Corporation Commission, 152 N.C. 548, 68 S.E. 155 (1910);
Brown v. Hennessey State Bank, 78 Okla. 141,
189 P. 355 (1920); Carolina National Bank of
Columbia v. Spigner, 106 S.C, 185, 90 S.E. 748
(1916); Union Bank of Richmond v. City of
Richmond, supra note 146; County of Sussex
v. Jarratt, 129 Va. 672, 106 S.E. 384 (1921).
See also 3 COOLEY, op. cit. supra note 4, at
989. But see San Francisco v. Mackay, 22 Fed.
602 (C.C. Cal. 1884).
155. 186 N.Y. 220, 78 N.E. 939, 10 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 1010 (1906); Kingsbury v. Chapin, Gardiner et al.v. Carter, both supra note 142; Matter of Thayer, 193 N.Y. 430, F6 N.E. 462 (1908).
See Matter of Willmer, 153 App. D. N.Y. 804,
138 N.Y.S. 649 (1912).
156. "It needs no particular illumination to
demonstrate that if we take such a view [that
the whole value of the shares slould be taxed]
it will clearly pave the way to a corresponding
view by the authorities and courts of Massachusetts [in which the company is also incorporated]
... . and that a person holding stock should
be assessed at the full value of his stock in each
jurisdiction . . . . And if

the corporation had

been compelled for sufficient reasons to'take out
incorporation in six or twenty other states each
one of them might take the same view and in-
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cause of incorporation in two or more states, for reasons of policy and interstate comity, and to avoid the evils of multiple state taxation necessarily
15 6
involved in any other holding.
Considerable reliance is to be found in cases upholding the tax here ir
question upon the analogous situation in the case of Tappan v. Merchant's
National Bank'57 and other similar cases, taking the position that "in corporations over which the states have control, their legislatures may fix the situs
of their stock for purposes of taxation, as Congress has in the case of stock
of national banks."' 5" While the general reasoning employed in the cases
is substantially the same as that used by the United States Supreme Court
in the Tappan case, the analogy is not at all complete, since without the specific authorization by act of Congress' 5 for the states to tax no such tax could
be levied at all,'6 ° and the provision in effect operates not only as an authorsist upon the same exaction until the value of
the property was in whole or large proportion
exhausted in paying for the privileges of sucWhile undoubtedly the legislacession to it.
tive authority is potent enough to prescribe and
enforce double taxation, it is plain that, measured by ordinary principles of justice, the result suggested would be inequitable and might
be seriously burdensome. Double taxation is
one which the courts should avoid whenever it
is possible within reason to do so. It is vever
to be presumed . . . . I see nothing in the statute
which prevents us from paying a decent regard
to the principles of interstate comity, and from
adopting a policy which will enable each state
fairly to enforce its own laws without oppresMatter of Cooley, supra
sion to the subject."
note 155, at 226. (Italics the writer's)
157. 19 \Vall, 490, 22 L.Ed. 189 (1873); Corry
v. Baltimore, supra note 23, the leading case
upholding the right of the state of incorporation
to tax shares owned by non-residents, relies most
strongly upon National Bank v. Commonwealth,
9 Wall. 353, 19 L.Ed. 701 (1870), and Tappan
v. Merchants' National Bank, both of which are
national bank stock cases.
158. Maxey, Situs of Personal Property for
Purposes of Taxation, 3 MINN. L.REV. 217,
228; Corry v. Baltimore, supra note 23. at 475;
Town of St. Albans v. National Car Co., supra
note 141, at 81.
159. U.S. Rev. Stat. see. 5219; 12 IT.S.C.A.
sec. 548.
160. "That shares of stock in a national bank
are not subject to taxation witiiout the consent
of Congress is conceded" Talbott v. Board of
Commissioners of Silver Bow County, 139 U.S.
438, 440, 11 S.Ct. 594, 35 LEd. 210 (1891).
"It is settled that the relation of the national
banks to the United States and the purposes
intended to be subserved by their creation are

such that there can be no taxation, by or under
state authority, of the banks, their prcperty, or
the shares of their capital stock otherwise than
in conformity with the terms and restrictions
embodied in the assent given by Congress to such
taxation." Des Moines National Irank v. Fairweather, 263 U.S. 103, 106, 44 S.Ct. 23, 68 L.Ed.
191 (1923).
"Of course, it must be conceded the settled
law of the land, as national banks are instrumentalities of government and moneys invested
in the shares of stock of such governmental agencies, it is utterly and absolutely beyond the power of the state to tax the same at all, mnless
thereunto authorized and empowered by the
Central National Bank
sovereign government."
of Topeka, Kansas v. McFarland, 20 F. (2d) 416
See also People v. Weav(lst D. Kan. 1927).
er, 100 U.S. 539, 25 L.Ed. 705 (1879); Rosenblatt v. Johnson, 104 U.S. 462, 26 L.Ed. 832
(1881) ; Mercantile National Bank v. City of New
York, 121 U.S. 138, 7 S.Ct. 826. 30 LEd. 895
(1887); National Bank v. Owenshoro, 173 U.S.
664, 19 S.Ct. 537, 43 L.Ed. 850 (1899); First
National Bank of Gulfport v. Adams, 258 U.S.
362, 42 S.Ct. 323, 66 L.Ed. 661 (1922); First
National Bank v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 341, 46
S.Ct. 135, 70 L.Ed. 295 (1926); and many other
cases. But for a view that- power did exist to
tax without such authorization and for an extended discussion of the problems involved, see
17
Traynor, National Bank Taxation (1929)
CALIF. L. REV. 83, and Schweppe, State Taxation of National Bank Stocks; Uncertainty of its
Constitutional Basis (1922), 6 MINN. L. REV.
219. Whether the Act of Congress serves to
authorize a tax that could not otherwise have
been levied, or whether as suggested by Schweppe at p. 222 on the basis of Van Allen v. Assessors, 3 Wall. 573. 18 L. Ed. 229 (1865), the
power existed but Congress through some theory
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ization but also as a restriction against discriminatory taxation" 1 and against
such shares being taxed elsewhere than in the state in which the corporate
enterprise is located. The national bank cases stand for the proposition that
the government is creating the banks as agencies or instrumentalities for
the conduct of certain of its functions, that for that reason and that reason
only, states would not be permitted to tax without its authorization and that
in giving its consent it may provide the extent to which, and the jurisdictional
basis upon which, the states may tax, and provide a reasonable means of
restricting that taxation to a single jurisdiction.
In the state cases the state is not restricting the taxation of shares of
stock in its corporations to a single state, as Congress is doing as to National
bank shares, a thing which the state has no power to do,' 62 but is merely
asserting that it will-tax by virtue of having created the corporation regardless of where the owner of the shares may reside and also regardless of
where the corporate enterprise is being carried on.
A denial of the power of the state of a corporation's domicile to tax its
shares owned by non-residents would not be inconsistent with a continuation of the existing doctrine with respect to the taxation of shares of stock
in national banks.
If the doctrine of singular taxation is to prevail as to both tangible and
intangible property, as would appear to be the ultimate goal aimed at by
the Court in its recent pronouncements, there seems to be no good reason
why an exception should be made with respect to shares of stock. In
arriving at a solution of the problems involved, the principal difficulties are
encountered in determining which shall prevail, the corporate domicile
above discussed, or the domicile of the shareholder.
(d)
As in the case of a tax at the corporate domicile, a tax at the
domicile of the shareholder is practically universally recognized 16 3 on the basis
of the maxim nmobilia sequuntur personam as in the case of other intangible
property. There is no gainsaying the fact that the property interest of the
64
shareholder is an intangible one in the nature of a chose.'
It is not subof concurrent power could limit the states' power
in that regard, the relation to and power, over
national banks and their shares by- Congress
is fundamentally different from that of a state
over the corporations it creates.
161. "As Congress was conferring a power
on the states which they would not otherwise
have had, to tax these shares, it undertook to impose a restriction on the exercise of that power,
manifestly designed to prevent taxation which
should discriminate against this class of property as compared with other moneyed capital.
People v. Weaver, supra note 160, at 543.
162. Hawley v. Malden, supra note 12, at 12,
13, raises without answering the question wheth.

er a state in creating a corporation could fix the
situs of its shares for purposes of taxation, by
whomsoever owned, so as to exclude taxation by
other states in which their owners might reside.
See Note L.R.A. 1915C 903, 942 and
163.
cases there collected.
164. Hawley v. Malden, supra note 12, at 12;
Union National Bank v. Chicago, Ved. Cas. No.
14,374, at p. 619 (C.C. N.D. Ill. 1871); Norrie
et al. v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 7 F. (2d)
(S.D. N.Y. 1925) 158, at 159; Herbert v. Sim.
son, supra note 139, at 482; I MORAWETZ,
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1886)
225; 1 COOK, CORPORATIONS (8th ed. 1923)
12.
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stantially different from other intangible property, and it appears that the
same reasons that prevail with the Court for upholding a tax at the owner's
domicile in the case of other intangibles should apply with equal force here.
On the contrary, there seems to be no compelling reason for continuing the
tax at the corporate domicile when the shares are held by non-residents.
Such a state may be shorn of this power and still be left with ample power
to tax everything within its jurisdiction. As heretofore suggested it may
levy a franchise tax upon the corporation for the privilege of incorporation
or of doing business therein, it may tax all property of the corporation within its territorial limits as any other state may do, it may subject to taxation
the income or receipts from the business of the corporation, and it may tax
such shares of stock as are owned by resident shareholders.
Looking at the recent United States Supreme Court cases decided prior
to the Farmers Loan and Trust and Baldwin cases, some comfort may be
found for the advocates of a tax in each jurisdiction. In the Frick case
the Court recognized the well settled law of the time that both states could
tax the transfer of such shares of stock but gave precedence to the tax of
the corporate domicile by requiring that Pennsylvania, the state of the
decedent shareholder's domicile, first must deduct the amount of the tax
paid to the states of incorporation in fixing the value upon which to levy
its transfer tax. This might seem to indicate that the Court regarded the
claim of the corporate domicile as superior to that of the shareholder's domicile. In the more recent decision in the case of Blodgett v. Silberman, the
tax at the domicile of the shareholder was sustained, despite a simultaneous
taxing at the corporate domicile, without any mention of the matter of making a deduction. It appears, however, that the state court' 65 had ruled that
such a deduction should be made, and as no such issue was raised before the
Supreme Court its failure to mention the matter does not necessarily indicate
an inclination to recede from the position taken in the Frick case. It doen,
however, serve to indicate that the Court was still committed to the doctrine
of taxability at the shareholder's domicile at a very recent date.
Since the determination of the Farmers Loan and Trust and Baldwin
cases by the Supreme Court, questions have arisen in various states as to
the taxation of shares of stock in domestic corporations, or their transfer,
when owned by non-residents, and with varying results. In Kentucky the
Circuit Court of Jefferson County, on December 13, 1930, held in the case of
Kentucky, State Tax Commission et al v. Equitable Trust Co. of New York,
etc., that Kentucky, the state of incorporation, could not tax the transfer
of such shares upon the death of their non-resident owner. 16 6 Thereafter
the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine arrived at the opposite conclusion in
165. Silberman v. Blodgett, 105 Conn.
217, 134 AtI. 778 (1926).

192

166.

U.S. Daily, Dec. 22, 1930, at 3219.
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the case of} State v. First National Bank of Boston, Administrator of the
Estate of Edward H. Haskell,'67 taking the position that the doctrine of the
recent Supreme Court cases has no application to shares of stock. More
recently the Supreme Court of Minnesota has upheld such a tax, 168 though
the transfer of the shares had already been taxed at the domicile of the
decedent shareholder in Wisconsin, relying largely upon Corry v. Baltimore 69 and Frick v. Pennsylvania, and' taking the position that there is
nothing in FarmersLoan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota or Baldwin v. Missouri
to indicate that the United States Supreme Court has receded from its holding in the Frick case which gave precedence to the tax at the corporate
domicile. The court also seemed to place some emphasis upon the fact that
the corporate business was being conducted within the state and substantially all of the corporate property was located therein. Rulings of a similar
tenor emanating fromi other official sources have appeared from time to
time.' ° The matter of applying a property tax to such shares of a domestic
corporation when owned by a non-resident was thought to be due for determination by the United States Supreme Court in the case of Susquehanna
Power Co. v. State Tax Commission of Maryland,'7' and it was expected
that such decision would also settle the matter with respect to the application of a transfer tax as the Court seems inclined to put the two on the same
basis. The case has been decided, however, without giving any authoritative answer to the question herein discussed. The tax involved, which was
called a capital stock tax and assessed against the corporation in first instance, but with an authorization to charge it against the stockholders, was
held valid as a tax in lieu of any other tax on the corporation's personal
property and it was held unnecessary to determine the rights of the nonresident stockholders in the matter.17 2 It is to be expected that some other
167. U.S. Daily, March 21, 1931, at 172.
168. In re Estate of Lund (Benson v. State),
U.S. Daily, May 18, 1931, at 652.
169. Supra note 23.
170. Attorney General Ward of New York,
in response to a request from the State Tax
Commission, ruled that notwithstanding the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
the Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. case, the
state's tax on the transfer of shares of stock
in domestic corporations owned hy non-residents
should be continued. U.S. Daily. May 22, 1930,
at 934. A similar ruling was more recently
given by Attorney General Parker of Utah. asserting that the decision of the Supreme Court
of the United States in the Farmers' Loan &
Trist Co. case had no application to corporate
stock. U.S. Daily. Dec. 16, 1930. at 3154. In
connection with these cases and rulings, ef.
Guaranty Trust Co. of New York et al. v. State
et al., 36 Ohio App. 45, 172 N.E. 674 (1930),

sustaining a tax by Ohio upon stock in a national
bank in that state owned by a non-resident.
171.
282 U.S ..........
51 S.Ct. 436, 75 L.Ed.
517 (1931).
The Court of Appeals of Maryland,
151 Atl. 39 (1930), had sustained the tax.
172. The Maryland statute provided for a
tax on the capital stock of every domestic corporation to be collected from the corporation
hut which when paid may be charged to the
stockholders and made a lien upon their stock.
In fixing the value the value of the corporation's real estate, which was otherwise taxed,
was to be deducted. There was no separate
tax on. the personal property of the corporation. In answer to the claim that as a tax on
the shareholder, all shares being held by a nonresident, it amounted to a denial of due process
as determined by the Supreme Court in Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore v. Virginia, and
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, the
state court, supra note 171, at 43, 44, held that
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case involving this issue, such as the Kentucky or Maine cases above referred to, will reach the Court soon 7' 3 and that we may have an authoritative
determination of the matter at an early date.
In addition to the four possibilities above discussed for the taxation of
shares of stock it might be pointed out, as a further exaggeration of the
existing evils, that certain other possible taxes are at least conceivable. The
contention has been frequently urged in the past that presence of corporate
property and the conduct of corporate business within a state should
be a sufficient basis for a tax upon the corporate shares or their transfer.
Most courts 17 4 were inclined to look upon the contention with disfavor, how-

ever, and since the decision of Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Doughton1 75 by the United States Supreme Court, the invalidity of a tax on such
basis is well recognized.
It is possible that the doctrine of business situs could be invoked for
the purpose of establishing a situs of shares of stock for purposes of taxation1 7 6 though apparently it has not been done in the past.

Added to all these possibilities as to transfer taxes, there exists the
Federal Estate Tax 1'7 7 which is applicable to increase still further the enor-

mous burden which may be imposed in such a case and which serves to indicate the importance of restricting state taxation to a single jurisdiction.
As the Court has determined in the case of notes, bonds, and bank deposits,
that taxation should be restricted to a single jurisdiction, and that the domicile of the owner, it seems the same result should be reached in the case of
corporate stock.
The above problems of taxing credits with a business situs and shares of
these cases had no application to shares of stock
and upheld the tax in reliance upon Corry v.
Baltimore, supra note 23. The Supreme Court
of the United States, referring to the tax being
in lieu of any other tax on the personal property of the corporation and thus valid, said,
"The tax was thus sustained on an adequate
state ground, and it is unnecessary to consider
the objections made to it on constitutional
grounds. None of them is directed at the statute
viewed, as the state court has construed it, as
imposing a tax on the personal property of the
Nor is it necessary on
appellant (corporation).
this record to consider how far any objection
made may be availed of by the non-resident stockholder, in the event of an attempted enforcement of the provisions of the statute which
authorize the tax to be charged to stockholders,
and create a lien upon the stock." Supra note
171, 51 S.Ct. at 437, 438.
173. An appeal from the decision of the
Maine Court has been filed with the Supreme
Court. U.S. Daily, June 29, 1931, at 998.

174. People v. Dennett, 276 I11. 43, 114 N.E.
493 (1916); People v. Cuyler, 276 Ill. 72, 114
N.E. 494 (1916); People v. Blair, 276 I1. 623,
115 N.E;. 218 (1917); State ex rel. Bankers
Trust Co. et al. v. Walker et al., 70 Mont. 484,
226 P. 894 (1924); Estate of Shepard, 184 Wis.
88, 197 N.W. 344 (1924); Tyler v. Dane, 289 F.
843 (W.D. Wis. 1923); and many other cases.
See collection of cases in Note (1926) 42 A.L.R.
413. See also Note (1925) 38 HARV. L. REV.
809, 813, and cases there cited.
175. Stpra note 148.
176. See State v. Harrington, supra note 11.
Cf. Stanford v. City and County of San Francisco, 131 Cal. 34, 63 Pac. 145 (1900). See also
Kroeger, op. cit. supra note 134, at 126; Peppin, op. cit. supra note 134, at 670.

177. The provision in the federal Revenue Act
of 1926, See. 301 (b), allowing a credit to the
extent of 80% of the federal tax due for any
estate, inheritance, legacy or succession tax paid
to a state serves to reduce somewhat the burden
that otherwise would be imposed.
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corporate stock are perhaps the most pressing of any left in the whole field
for the Court's determination. The solution of these problems herein suggested may at first glance appear a bit inconsistent because of the fact that

in the latter the maxim mobilia sequuntur personam,would be permitted to
govern while in the former it would not.

But the results should be reach-

ed, it is submitted, largely aside from matters of fiction and on- the basis of
fact. The facts in the two situations would seem to demand that the maxim
give way in the one case but not in the other.
DOES ANY DISTINCTION REMAIN BETWEEN THE BASIS FOR A
PROPERTY TAX AND THAT FOR A TRANSFER TAX?
No effort has been made in this article to carry out any clear-cut distinction in the various situations between the requisites for a property tax and
for a transfer or inheritance tax. While once recognized by the cases,'7
the distinction now seems practically to have ceased to exist. In a case
like Baldwin v. Missouri,, where bonds, notes, and bank deposits are involved, it may become necessary to secure ancillary letters of administration in order to complete the transfer. The notes and bonds, for example,
in that case were really within Missouri for purposes of such administration
and were subjected to its power to that extent. If the tax is not one on the
property, but an excise exacted for the privilege of transfer or succession,
the contention that a state situated as was Missouri in that case has a propei

basis on which to tax is not without some merit. But the result of the recent
cases decided by the United States Supreme Court in denying validity to
such taxes seems to indicate that there is no longer any difference to be
taken between the requisites for jurisdiction to levy a property tax and an
inheritance or transfer tax. The assertion of the Court in Buck v. BeachY7
referred to with approval in Wheeler v. Sohiner,'1 80 to the effect that such
a distinction exists would seem no longer to represent the law. The Court
now c6tes interchangeably property tax cases and transfer tax cases as tbeing
equally authoritative for either type of tax,"8 ' quite in contrast with the
178. United States v. Perkins, 163 U.S. 625,
16 S.Ct. 1073, 41 L.Ed. 287 (1896) ; Magoun v.
Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 170 U.S. 283,
18 S.Ct. 594, 42 L.Ed. 1037 (1898); Knowlton
v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 20 S.Ct. 747, 44 L.Ed.
969 (1900); Eidman v. Martinez. 184 U.S. 578,
22 S.Ct. 515, 46 L.Ed. 697 (1902); Moore v.
Ruckgaber, 184 U.S. 593, 22 S.Ct. 521, 46 L.Ed.
705 (1902); Buck v. Beach, supra note 65; In
re Waldron's Estate, supra note 6; State v.
Griffith, 245 II1. 532, 92 N.E. 313 (1910);
Matter of Knoedler, 140 N.Y. 377, 35 N.E. 601
(1893).
179. Supra note 65, at 408.

180. Supra note 5, at 440.
181.
The Court in Frick v. Pennsylvania,
sspra note 3, relied completely upon property
See Seefurth, Recent Limitations on
tax cases.
the Power to Impose Inheritance and Estate
Taxes (1925) 25 COL.L.REV. 870, 873, 874.
Reliance by the Court in the Farmers' Loan
and Trust Co. and Ifaldwin cases was strongly
upon property tax cases, particularly the Union
Refrigerator Transit Co. case.
'"he more recent cases, Frick v. Pennsylvania,
Blodgett v. Silberman, and Rhode Island Hospitol Trust Co. v. Doughton, are clear in the
enunciation of the principle that to measure
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earlier practice of making a distinction to show that the one or the other
type of case was not in point. 182 The doctrine of the Court from the Frick
case to the present clearly has seemed to be that the property involved by
which the tax is measured must be within the state seeking to tax in the
same fashion for a transfer tax as for a property tax. As asserted in the
Frick case, ". . . to impose either tax the state must have jurisdiction over
the thing that is taxed . .
The same idea is expressed by the Court

inthe Rhode Island Trust Co. case where it says, "The tax here is not upon
property, but upon the right of succession to property, but the principle that
the subject to be taxed must be within the jurisdiction of the state applie3
as well in the case of a transfer tax as in that of a property tax."'18 4 The
language of the Court appears to substantiate this position and carry the
doctrine even further in Baldwin v. Missouri with the assertion that "The
bonds and notes, although physically within Missouri, under our former
opinions were choses in action with situs at the domicile of the creditor...
As they were not within Missouri for tax purposes, the transfer was not
subject to her power. '85
Taking the position that the jurisdictional basis for the levy of the two
taxes is now the same does not mean that one must lose sight of the fact that
certain exceptional situations exist where a transfer tax may be sustained
but where a property tax would be held invalid. Such holdings are based,
not upon any lack of the requisite jurisdiction, but upon the exempt character of the property, or upon implied restrictions for the protection ot
government instrumentalities, as; are involved in the case of a state tax
upon the transfer of United States bonds:1s6 a federal estate tax upon the
transfer of state bonds ;157 a state transfer tax upon property bequeathed to
the United States;"'8 or a federal estate tax upon bequests made to a
1 89
state.

a succession tax by property values, there must
be jurisdiction over the property, and in those
cases succession tax decisions and property tax
decisions are interchangeahly cited. I submit
that it remains only to state definitely, that the
privilege character of succession taxation has
no further influence in extending the jurisdiction of the state to measure a succession tax
by the value of property which it has no power
to tax directly."
Kroeger, op. cit. supra note
134, at 135:
182. Buck v. Beach, supra note 65, at 408;
Mr. Justice McKenna's dissent in Wheeler v.
Sohmer, supra note 5, at 446; cases cited supra
note 178.
183.
Supra note 3 at 492.
184. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v.
Doughton, supra note 152, at 80.

185.
Supra note 17, at 593. It is to be noted
that ancillary letters of administration with will
annexed were issued by the Probate Court of
Lewis County, Missouri, and the Missouri Supreme Court held that the bonds, notes, etc.,
were properly and lawfully in the custody of the
Missouri administrator, and properly within the
jurisdiction and control of the probate court
in Missouri. State v. Estate of Baldwin, supra
note 97, at 215.
186. Plummer v. Coler, 178 U.S. 115, 20 S.Ct.
829. 44 LEd. 998 (1900).
187. Griener v. Llewellyn, 258 U.S. 384, 42
S.Ct. 324, 66 LEd. 676 (1922).
188. United States v. Perkins, supra note
178.
189. Snyder v, Bettman, 190 U.S. 249, 23
S.Ct. 803, 47 L.Ed. 1035 (1903).

DEVELOPMENT IN THE TAXATION OF INTANGIBLES

Aside fronq exceptional situationssuch as these, the distinction seems to
be no longer recognized and the necessary jurisdictional basis for the one
seems to be the same as that for the other.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it may be said that while the Supreme Court has by no
means entirely ended the evils of multiple state taxation of intangible property or its transfer, it has taken a long stride in that direction in the Farmers
Loan and Trust and Baldwin cases. And while the results of those cases
were not arrived at without encountering certain more or less serious constitutional obstacles which the Court avoided rather than overcame by the
application of conceptions of justice, economic fairness and policy drawn
from its interpretation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, no greater obstacles would appear to bar its progress in extending
the principles announced so as to eliminate many or most of the remaining
evils of multiple state taxation.
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